8 spontaneously decide it, since in a final analysis it is the latter who responds for the good operation of the trial, this is, for the due development of the process, attending to the demands of the law and the requirements of justice. This was not what occurred in the case that is now before us. It is true that some facts from the original indictment and the judgment with which the process was closed coincide, but it is also true that others, of great importance, do not coincide at all. 31. To prove the above one just has to observe the criminal description of aggravated rape in Article 175, in relation with 173, of the Criminal Code of Guatemala, and that of aggravated murder (called “murder” in the national criminal code), formulated in Article 132, in relation with 123 of the same code. Rape is forced carnal knowledge perpetrated against a women –states Article 173—and there is the possibility –states 175, that describes the complementary aggravated figure— that “with motive or as a consequence of the rape” the victim may die. Instead, murder is the deprivation of life –pursuant to Article 123—carried out in the form, with the means, under the impulse, or with the purpose described in Article 132. Thus, each punishable act is integrated by its own elements, characteristics that must be proposed in the indictment and that are or must be subject to the examination of the defendant and his defense. If the conviction is issued for acts different to those stated in the indictment, the consistency between the latter and the judgment will be breached. Only the integrity of that link proves that the defendant adequately exercised the right to a defense acknowledged by the State and that it is obliged to respect and guarantee. 32. In the light of Article 8 of the American Convention, a judgment adopted in this manner is not valid. Now, this does not mean, at all, that the Inter-American Court is freeing the defendant of his responsibility, nor does it mean that it is declaring that such responsibility exists. It is only issuing one conclusion: the violation of the due process deprives the judgment of judicial support and obliges the State, as has been mentioned by the Court, to proceed with, if it decides to do so, a new trial in which the requirements of the due process are observed in order to reach the conclusion derived from the facts put forward by the accuser, the evidence presented by the parties or brought forward by the court, and the debate regarding them –not regarding other facts. Therefore, there is not a risk of impunity but a demand for justice pursuant to the stipulations of the American Convention, which the State has ratified. 33. It is important to point out, always regarding this matter, but also related to the one I will proceed to examine below, that the alleged change in the classification of the facts, that in this case has actually been a modification of the facts themselves – modification that may or may not have reflected reality; this is not being discussed by the Inter-American Court, because it does not have the power to do so—produces consequences of great importance. In effect, the punishment established for aggravated rape is imprisonment of 30 to 50 years, except when the victim is younger than 10 years old (Article 132 bis of the Criminal Code), which does not occur in this case. Instead, the punishment for murder is the death of the inmate when certain circumstances of the act are present, the occasion, the motives, or the commission of the act reveals “a greater specific dangerousness of the agent.” This reference gave place to the examination of the Court and determined the conclusions I will proceed to comment. D) Dangerousness of the agent