35 82. In its submission of November 30, 2001, the State raised the issue of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies with the Commission, 28, but the only remedy not exhausted that the State cited was the “action challenging constitutionality.” 83. Based on the criteria cited above (supra para. 81), the Court finds that inasmuch as the State did not allege a failure to exhaust the remedies of review and habeas corpus during the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission, it implicitly waived one means of defense that the American Convention creates in its favor, and tacitly admitted that such remedies either do not exist or were exhausted in a timely manner. 29 Therefore, the principle of estoppel prevents the State from raising this argument, for the first time, in its brief answering the application and its observations on the written brief of pleadings, motions and evidence (supra para. 33). 84. A different situation presents itself in the case of the “action challenging constitutionality,” since in its November 30, 2001 brief, during the admissibility proceeding conducted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the State argued the failure to substantiate this remedy. 85. The Court is compelled to point out that the action challenging constitutionality is an extraordinary recourse whose purpose is to question the constitutionality of a law, not to have a court ruling reviewed. Hence, the action challenging constitutionality cannot be counted among the domestic remedies that a petitioner is necessarily required to pursue and exhaust. 86. In its Admissibility Report No. 128/01 of December 3, 2001, the Commission wrote that the “central object of the petition” filed with the Commission was the sanction that the November 12, 1999 judgment the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José imposed, and that by filing a writ of cassation, the alleged victims had exhausted the domestic remedies. 30 87. The Court has no grounds to re-examine the Commission’s reasoning, which is completely consistent with the relevant provisions of the Convention. The Court, therefore, dismisses the first preliminary objection. * * * SECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION 33; and Case of Cantoral Benavides. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 3, 1998. Series C No. 40, para. 31. 28 Cf. Brief answering the questions posed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at the November 16, 2001 hearing (file of proceedings with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, volume II, folios 273 to 277). 29 Cf. Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary Objections, supra note 25, para. 56; Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. Preliminary Objections, supra note 26, para. 56; and Case of Loayza-Tamayo. Preliminary Objections, supra note 25, para. 43. 30 Cf. Admissibility Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights No. 128/01 (file of the proceeding before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Volume II, folio 296).