to the statute of limitations. Consequently, since the new criminal definition does not clearly establish the continuous nature of the offense, it would appear that it is only applicable in the future and not to forced disappearances that took place prior to the legal definition, but that have continued over time because the whereabouts or fate of the victims or of their mortal remains has not been determined. Furthermore, with regard to the offense of torture the Commission noted that the text adopted overcomes the limitation regarding the perpetrators (active subjects) of this conduct, which was previously restricted to public servants. 21. In its Judgment, the Court ordered the State to define both offenses “in the terms of and in compliance with the obligations assumed [by Panama] under the [Inter-American] Convention on Forced Disappearance and the [Inter-American] Convention against Torture, as of March 28, 1996 and August 28, 1991, respectively.”12 In this regard, the Court takes cognizance of Law No. 1 of January 13, 2011, which amended and added articles to the Criminal Code of Panama regarding the offenses of forced disappearance of persons and torture. 22. The State modified the legal definition of the offense of forced disappearance, contemplated in Article 152 of the Criminal Code, as follows: The act of depriving a person or persons of their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by Agents of the State or by individuals or groups acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State, followed by an absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees, shall be punished with imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years. 23. The Court notes that the definition used by the law transcribes the definition of forced disappearance established in Article II of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons.13 Therefore, the Court confirms that, with the entry into force of Law No. 1 of January 13, 2011, the State of Panama has complied with its obligation to define forced disappearance in accordance with its international obligations. 24. Nevertheless, the Court notes that this regulation does not refer to the continuous or permanent nature of the offense nor does it state that the statute of limitations does not apply to criminal proceedings in cases of forced disappearance. Consequently, the Court considers that the aforementioned definition partially complies with the requirements set forth in the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons and those ordered in the Judgment. In view of the foregoing, the State must take the necessary steps to adapt, within a reasonable period, its domestic legislation regarding the continued and permanent nature of the offense of forced disappearance and the non-application of the statute of limitations to criminal proceedings for this offense, and to provide information on this matter. 12 Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 7, para. 259. 13 Article II: For the purposes of this Convention, forced disappearance is considered to be the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State, followed by an absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees. 7