human being individually, as well as of groups of people threatened or injured. And, fourth, it can be invoked in the safeguarding of different human rights to be protected. 57. In the Kantian conception, the behavior (moral) of human beings is guided by reason, and not by self-interest or the search for personal advantages. Its hypothetical imperative leads us to reach a specific goal without referring to an intrinsic value, while its categorical imperative orients us to choose a course of action, pursuant to the intrinsic value of the goal to be reached.46 It is precisely here that their actions must aspire to configure at the same time a universal law (supra). Based on their humanity, every person is an end in themselves, never a means, and this is how it must be seen by others. The Kantian imperative has a deep humanistic sense. 58. E. Kant is very clear when he warns that human beings "existe comme fin en soi, et non pas simplement comme moyen dont telle ou telle volonté puisse user à son gré; dans toutes ses actions, aussi bien dans celles qui le concernent lui-même que dans celles qui concernent d'autres êtres raisonnables, il doit toujours être considéré en même temps comme fin."47 His imperative, - as stated by himself, - extends to all beings endowed with reason, to all humanity, which must be considered as an end in itself.48 For Kant, "faire preuve d'humanité consiste à prendre part au sort des autres hommes; l'inhumanité est l'attitude de celui qui est indifférent au sort des hommes."49 59. The Kantian imperative has effectively been invoked in the vindication of different human rights. An appropriate example is that of the guarantees of the due process of law. It is imperative that a human being, who turns to a court because he considers that his rights were violated, know the reasons that motivated the judgment that refers to him and feels free to request its interpretation if he does not consider it is sufficiently clear. A party cannot be treated as if he were a simple means in the so called “administration or . E. Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs (1785), Paris, Libr. Delagrave, 1999, pp. 15, 43, and 47. 46 . 47 Ibid., p. 148, and cf. p. 150. . Ibid., p. 153. According to Kant, "quand quelqu'un déshonore l'humanité d'un autre homme, c'est comme s'il enlevait toute valeur à la sienne propre, et c'est comme s'il la dégradait"; E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique (1775-1780), Paris, Livr. de Poche/Classiques de Philosophie, 1997, p. 335. 48 . E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique, op. cit. supra n. (24), p. 336. – In the XX century, in a similar line of concern and reasoning, Gustav Radbruch stated that the essence of the notion of person lies in equality before the law and the equal juridical capacity of human beings (inherent to them, regardless of the powers granted to them by the legal system); the relationship between “being” and “end” established herein, - G. Radbruch warned, - "is precisely inverse to that established in organicism theories.” In synthesis, “to be a person is the same as being an end-in-themselves (Selbstzweck);" G. Radbruch, Filosofia do Direito, 4a. ed. rev., volume II, Coimbra, A. Amado Ed., 1961, pp. 18-20. 49 17