- 107 - reports and had accepted the possibility of the result (dolus eventualis or legal intention), but also in the eventuality that they had underestimated the reports, rejecting the possibility of that result (conscious guilt). Furthermore, the State should not have rejected the latter element of criminal responsibility because, in light of the characteristics of the sexual abuse, which was not committed by a single individual, but in group, it is evident that the law enforcement agents who took part in the operation lacked the most elemental and appropriate training, and any duly organized and disciplined police force would never have permitted the perpetration of such heinous crimes by a group of its agents. 298. This Court does not advocate any form of objective criminal responsibility that would be contrary to the contemporary general principles of criminal responsibility and, consequently, pursuant to these universally recognized principles, reaffirms that only the person acting with intent or with imprudence or negligence commits a crime. The Court understands that, in this case, it is for the State’s criminal judges to establish whether there was dolus eventualis (if the superior officers knew of the acts or evidence of them and ignored this, admitting the possibility of the result) or whether, to the contrary, they did not incur in dolus eventualis. In the latter case, which would be the most favorable to the superiors in the chain of command, the Court observes that there was no investigation, either, into their possible responsibility by guilt (imprudence owing to organizing the operation with an undisciplined and disorganized police force) or negligence (underestimating the reports that reached them). In the Court’s opinion, it would appear that, at least, the latter possibility needed to be investigated, because the fact itself, revealing the extreme lack of discipline and preparation of the law enforcement agencies whose members were the perpetrators of the crimes, is an extremely clear indication of imprudence, because plainly the superior who organizes an operation of this nature, using a force with such internal disorder, incurs in a clear violation of his duty of care based on his function of command and decision. It should be pointed out that the SCJN indicated this also. 409 299. Regarding the possibility of lesser criminal responsibility for those responsible in the chain of command, the Court indicates that the argument that an investigation into possible responsibility of the superior officers for violation of the duty of care was omitted because torture and rape require intent and do not admit negligence is invalid. 300. Pursuant to the principle that each participant in a crime is only responsible for his own wrongful act, it is true that the perpetrators, instigators and accessories to the crimes of torture and rape can only commit these crimes by dolus eventualis or dolus directus and, in particular, that rape is a crime that can only be perpetrated by the individual who commits it directly and personally (on his own). And also that the injuries suffered by the victims as a result of the crimes attributed to those agents cannot be considered “concurso ideal” [where one and the same act is an offence against several different statutory provisions], because those injuries are absorbed by the violence required by such crimes, and this is even clearer when, in general, the definition of those acts [injuries] indicates that they are aggravating factors of the crime, as is the possible result of death. 301. Despite the foregoing and, based on the principle that a criminal act is always personal, the State failed to comply with its obligation to investigate, at the very least, the criminal responsibility of the superiors in the chain of command, by not investigating their possible responsibility by guilt (negligence or imprudence) with regard to the victims’ injuries that were verified, because these were crimes that were obviously established in domestic law, also based 409 See above, footnotes 245 and 246 of this judgment.