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(iii) in the case of those who did not state that they had been victims of rape, the intensity of the
physical or mental suffering was evident, because they were all beaten severely and subjected to
other forms of sexual violence, and (iv) the violence was committed in order to debase, humiliate
and punish the women for supposedly taking part in the protests suppressed by the operations.
153. The representatives argued that: (1) the violence suffered by the eleven women
constituted violence against women and, therefore, was discriminatory in nature; (2) the 11
women underwent physical, psychological and sexual torture and, subsequently, did not receive
adequate medical and psychological care when they arrived at the prison and during the following
days; rather, to the contrary, they suffered renewed acts of physical and psychological violence at
the hands of medical professionals; (3) the women suffered another violation of their integrity
owing to the absence of even a minimally adequate response from the State, conserving key
evidence, taking statements, and opening investigations into evident signs (and complaints) of
torture when the victims reached the prison, and (4) the State violated the honor and dignity of
the 11 women because: (i) the sexual torture of which they were victims sought to humiliate
them and treat them in a denigrating manner, which entailed a serious act against the free
exercise of the sexual intimacy and autonomy of the eleven women, and (ii) they were revictimized by being exposed in the media by declarations that stigmatized them. The victims in
this case experienced a multiplicity of the said acts repeatedly, sequentially and/or
simultaneously. Thus, the representatives asked the Court to make a legal analysis of the
violation of the integrity of the eleven women assessing all the acts of violence described
(physical, psychological and sexual).
154. In their final written arguments,221 the representatives added that the State
violated the right to public protest of the eleven women, recognized in Articles 13 and
Convention, regardless of their role in the demonstration. They indicated that the said
violated by the mere fact that the women were in a space in which that right was being
and, for the State, this was sufficient justification to subject them to extreme violence.
had also
15 of the
right was
exercised
155. Lastly, the representatives argued that the State’s legal framework facilitated the excessive
use of force and the violation of human rights in contexts of social protest. They underlined that
Mexico had not adopted “the legislative, institutional or any other kind of measures to ensure that
law enforcement personnel respect the human rights of the population in situations of social
protest; to limit the use of force in accordance with international law, or to guarantee the
documentation or investigation of police operations in keeping with the said international
framework.”
156. The State acknowledged its responsibility for violating the rights to personal integrity and to
privacy, the right not to be tortured, and the right to live a life free of violence of the women,
owing to the physical, psychological and sexual abuse, including acts of sexual torture, as well as
the debasing treatment and the interference in their private life, the lack of adequate medical
treatment, and the effects on their health. In this regard and, based on the determinations made
by the SCJN, it recalled that “senior police officers and agents mistreated the detainees physically
and morally, thus failing to comply with the principles that should regulate the use of force;
however, these serious violations of individual guarantees and human rights were not due to a
The representatives indicated that they made this allegation because, during the public hearing, the President of the
Court at the time, under the iura novit curia principle, had expressly asked them to refer to the violation of those rights.
Indeed, during the hearing, the President asked that “in the final arguments, the representatives also refer to [the right of
assembly], because the case was presented from the perspective of gender-based violence, and also from the perspective
of gender, but the collective right of assembly, I believe also merits reflection in the final arguments.”
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