- 61 - of force, based on the degree of cooperation, resistance or aggression by the subject to be restrained and, consequently, use tactics of negotiation, control or use of forces, as appropriate.234 163. An assessment of the conventionality of the use of force should be made in every circumstance and in the context of the events,235 taking the above criteria into account. 164. In light of the conditions required for the use of force by the State, the Court will now analyze the use of force that took place on May 3 and 4, 2006, in Texcoco and San Salvador de Atenco. 165. In the instant case, even though the State acknowledged the violations committed against the eleven women owing to the excessive use of force, it repeatedly underscored the SCJN’s finding that the use of force was legitimate and that there was no evidence that express instructions had been given “to injure or abuse the protesters”;236 rather, the assaults and human rights violations were the result of actions ultra vires237 of some state officials who failed to comply with their duty (supra paras. 124 and 125). In this regard, the Court considers that the State is making a partial and selective reading of the SCJN judgment, which concluded with regard to the legitimacy of the use of force that: (i) the operation on the morning of May 3, 2006, to try and prevent the flower sellers from setting up in the market was neither legitimate nor justified,238 and (ii) that, although the operation of May 4, 2006, initially had a legitimate purpose, “the objectives of the different interventions by the police forces gradually changed, as the events progressed,” and “in implementing them, events began to take on a tone and form that spiraled out of their control.”239 In this regard, it underlined, inter alia, that: (i) an indeterminate number of police agents who took part in the operation of May 4, 2006, worked under physical and emotional conditions that may have influenced their conduct to some extent because they had 234 Cf. Basic Principles on the Use of Force, Principles Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 9. Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Retén de Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C No. 150, para. 82, and Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292, para. 266. 235 236 SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folio 31056). According to Article 7 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts drafted by the UN International Law Commission, an internationally wrongful act shall be attributed to the State for the “conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority […] even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.” United Nations General Assembly, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/RES/56/83, January 28, 2002. 237 In this regard, the SCJN indicated that: “far from taking actions that would reflect the agreement and commitment to tolerate the sales the following day, municipal police, together with state police, significantly increased the police presence during the early morning hours of that day. Thus, on the morning of May 3, when the flower sellers arrived with their supporters to set up their stalls, aware that the police presence had been increased during the night (they were already carrying their machetes and had requested the support of members of the Peoples’ Front), the people’s anger at the authorities heated up because, added to it was the perception that the state authorities had deceived them the previous day, ignoring their requests, and there was even a feeling that they were being goaded. […] In this specific factual context, the operation executed that day – even if its purpose had been dissuasive – was not only unjustified but, to the contrary, it was not difficult to see that it was inappropriate because, in the context of the facts, it was a provocative operation, a time bomb. And, based on the known record of the People’s Front, it was foreseeable that it would cause a great deal of anger among the civilians towards the police, which ended in the head-on confrontation already identified, when reciprocal defense became mutual aggression. On this basis, [this] operation […] which resulted in the confrontation between municipal police and inspectors and the sellers and their supporters, was not justified; thus, from the start, the use of force was not legitimate. […] Therefore, the confrontation can only be considered an inefficient, unprofessional, unnecessary and disproportionate action by the municipal authorities that, evidently, had no constitutional justification. Cf. SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folios 31172, 31173 and 31174). 238 239 SCJN judgment of February 12, 2009 (evidence file, folios 31055 to 31057).