- 72 - conducts deployed by the state agents against the eleven women victims in this case were of a sexual nature and therefore constituted sexual violence. 189. In addition, as alleged by the Commission and the representatives, acknowledged by the State and described by the victims, Court notes that: (i) Norma Aidé Jiménez Osorio, (ii) Mariana Selvas Gómez, (iii) Ana María Velasco Rodríguez, (iv) Suhelen Gabriela Cuevas Jaramillo, (v) Bárbara Italia Méndez Moreno, (vi) Angélica Patricia Torres Linares and (vii) Claudia Hernández Martínez, were also victims of rape, to the extent that they underwent specific forms of sexual violence that included penetration of their bodies (vagina, anus and mouth) by the police agents, in some cases, in a joint and coordinated manner, with fingers, penises and, in one case, an object (supra para. 187). 190. Having determined that the eleven women in this case were victims of sexual violence, and seven of them also of rape, the Court must determine whether this violence also constituted torture. B.2.b Torture 191. According to the Court’s case law, in light of Article 5(2) of the American Convention, torture should be understood as any act of ill-treatment that: (i) is intentional; (ii) causes severe physical or mental suffering, and (iii) is committed with an objective or purpose. 286 192. The Court recalls that an international legal regime has been established concerning the absolute prohibition of all forms torture, both physical and psychological and, regarding the latter, it has been recognized that threats and the real danger of someone being subjected to serious physical injury produces, in certain circumstances, a moral anguish of such intensity that it may be considered “psychological torture.”287 193. Furthermore, in numerous cases, the Court’s case law has determined that rape is a form of torture.288 This Court has considered that the intense suffering of the victim is inherent in rape and, in general, rape, like torture, pursues, among other purposes, that of intimidating, debasing, humiliating, punishing or controlling the victim. 289 For a rape to be classified as torture, the Cf. Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 164, para. 79, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2018. Series C No. 362, para. 186. 286 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of December 3, 2001. Series C No. 88, para. 102, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2018. Series C No. 362, para. 183. 287 See, inter alia, Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215, para. 128; Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2010. Series C No. 216, para. 118; and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, para. 132; Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 16, 2017. Series C No. 333, para. 252 288 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215, para. 127, and Case of López Soto et al. v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2018. Series C No. 362, para. 187. 289