8. In this type of organization, judges must renounce the rights inherent in their condition as individuals with their own ideas, world views and values, to obey those of the leadership of the corporation, becoming its subordinates. 9. It is impossible to ensure judicial impartiality – which is implicitly essential for judicial independence – by seeking to incorporate individuals who lack ideologies, values and world views as judges, because they do not exist; at least, with minimum mental health. Moreover, it is also impossible to do this by incorporating individuals who, in order to remain in their posts, give up their personal values, ideas and world vision, assuming those of the organ’s leadership, in an attitude of obedience, subordination and inhibition, unworthy not only of a judge but also of any citizen. 10. The only judicial impartiality – humanly and democratically possible and imperative – is the impartiality provided by the internal pluralism of the Judiciary that enables discussions and critiques among judges that are informative for public opinion and for the judges themselves. 11. No Judiciary is perfect, just as nothing human is perfect, and the urge towards higher levels of perfection depends on the dynamic of open and democratic criticism, especially within the Judiciary – in other words, among judges. 12. To this end, it is evident that judges must be free from external pressure, but also internal pressure from the collegiate organs themselves. The external independence of the Judiciary, as a condition of the impartiality of the judges, is only achieved by also ensuring the internal independence of judges that conditions ideological pluralism among judges as a guarantee of the internal debates of the Judiciary. 13. Judges are not employees or subordinates of the collegiate organs composed of their colleagues. The Judiciary of every democratic State should be organized horizontally. Thus, a democratic State with a verticalized Judiciary is as absurd as a horizontalized army. 14. The judicial structure of democratic States should respect – above all – the personal dignity of every judge and, consequently, hierarchies among judges should not be admitted, with superiors and inferiors, because this is true of the courts, but not of the judges. There cannot be hierarchization among judges – all of whom areindividuals and citizens – only different jurisdictions. 15. Any corporative pretension conspires against the guarantee that everyone will be tried by independent and impartial judges by subjecting them to judges who have accepted the curtailment of their own right to express themselves freely and critically. Hence, the individual who has renounced his civic freedom is not in a position to assess that of others. 16. It is not possible to ignore that any legal system that respects human rights must respond to an non-transcendental concept of law as such; in other words, law whose objective does not transcend the individual towards any ultrapersonal entity. It would be difficult to apply law conceived in this way for an individual who – as a judge – was subject to an ultrapersonal entity – in other words, immersed in a biased or transcendent legal sector. 2