3 procedural norms, such as those referring to compliance with the decisions of the Court. These obligations are to be interpreted and enforced in a manner such that the protected guarantee is truly practical and effective, bearing in mind the special nature of human rights treaties.4 * * * 7. The representatives informed the Court in their communication of March 4, 2010 (supra Having Seen 3) that on February 10, 2010, Mr. Kimel passed away. 8. The Court, in its March 8, 2010 note, offered its condolences to Mr. Kimel’s family members and, deeply regrets that Mr. Kimel’s death occurred prior to the Judgment being fully complied with. * * * 9. With respect to the obligation to pay the amounts set in the Judgment as compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and reimbursement of legal costs and expenses (sixth operative paragraph), the State informed that the corresponding payment “for every item indicated in the Judgment […] was made effective on September 24, 2008.” It indicated that, on said date, the General Treasury of the Nation deposited the total sum of US$40,000.00 (forty thousand dollars of the United States of America) in the bank account indicated by Mr. Kimel. 10. The representatives confirmed that “the compensation had been made effective” and they stated that the State had adopted “the appropriate measures” to comply with the present obligation. Similarly, the Commission observed that “this measure should be deemed satisfied.” 11. The Tribunal observes that, according to the information submitted, the State paid Mr. Kimel the total amount ordered in the Judgment, within the timeframe it established. As a consequence, the Tribunal considers that the State has fully complied with operative paragraph six of the Judgment. * * * 12. In relation to the obligation to set aside the criminal sentence imposed on Mr. Kimel and all the effects deriving therefrom (seventh operative paragraph), the State indicated that “the practical consequences derived from the judgment in the criminal case in question have been set aside,” and provided information regarding the steps taken to eliminate the victim’s criminal record. Nonetheless, the State added that “for the annulment as such of the criminal judgment and its feasibility in the context of [its] juridical system, the corresponding determinations by the permanent legal and technical services of each ministry of the State should be awaited.” 13. The representatives informed that fulfillment of this measure is pending because the criminal sentence has not been set aside, given that “the corresponding tribunal has not made any decision on the matter yet.” They noted that the State has not submitted any evidence that it has studied or put into place concrete mechanisms in order to obtain a judicial decision or an opinion from the legal and technical services to which it made reference in its report. They indicated that, although in Argentina there is no rule that 4 Cf. Case of Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 37; Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 1, considering clause six, and Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 1, considering clause five.