- 16 - have competence to classify an act as a crime against humanity under its function of applying the inter-American norms. 41. The Court recalls that the purpose of its mandate is the application of the American Convention and other treaties that grant it jurisdiction. It is not for the Court to establish individual responsibilities,36 determination of which falls under the jurisdiction of the domestic or the international criminal courts; rather its mandate is to assess the facts submitted to it and to assess them in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction based on the evidence presented by the parties.37 42. When examining the merits in cases of serious human rights violations, the Court has taken into account that, if they were committed in the context of massive and systematic or generalized attacks against one sector of the population,38 such violations can be characterized or classified as crimes against humanity in order to explain clearly the extent of the State’s responsibility under the Convention in the specific case, together with the juridical consequences. Hence, the Court in no way attempts to attribute a crime to any natural person. In this regard, the need for comprehensive protection of the individual under the Convention has led the Court to interpret its provisions through their convergence with other norms of international law,39 particularly with regard to the prohibition of crimes against humanity, which is ius cogens, without this implying that it has exceeded its powers, because, it should be reiterated that, in doing so, it respects the authority of the criminal jurisdiction to investigate, indict and punish the individuals responsible for such crimes. What the Court does, in accordance with treaty-based law40 and customary law, is to employ the terminology used by other branches of international law in order to assess the legal consequences of the alleged violations vis-à-vis the State’s obligations. 43. Consequently, the Court declares the third preliminary objection inadmissible, because it bears no relation to the extent of its competence, since the Court would never charge a natural person or a State with the perpetration of a crime. C. The Court’s lack of temporal jurisdiction to examine certain contextual facts presented by the victims’ representatives 44. The State requested the Court to exclude from its analysis all the alleged facts, whether presented as context or background, that occurred prior to Colombia’s acceptance of the Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction, and that appear in the section on 36 Cf. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 134, and Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 37. See also, Anzualdo Castro v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 22, 2009. Series C No. 202, para. 36; Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 37; Boyce et al. v. Barbados. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2007. Series C No. 169, footnote 37, and Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166, para. 93. 37 Cf. Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 10, 2007. Series C No. 167, para. 87, and Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para. 79. 38 Cf. Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, paras. 94 to 96 and 98 to 99. 39 Cf. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs, supra note 22, para. 115. 40 Art. 33.3.c. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.