been violated as a result of the revocation of citizenship, was based on an incorrect interpretation of the legal principles involved, particularly with respect to the scope of the principle of “grounds for prejudiciality” and its derivation from the principle of presumption of innocence. It argued that what Federal Court No. 2 of Mendoza had taken into account when declaring the citizenship granted to Ms. Habbal invalid was not her individual criminal responsibility for submitting documents containing false statements, but rather the false information contained in the documents on which the granting of naturalization was based. Hence, there was no need to wait for a criminal judgment to determine that “fraud” had been committed, since the connotation was not criminal, but civil, according to the Federal Court’s analysis. Therefore, it argued that the revocation of citizenship did not violate the principle of the presumption of innocence in the case of Ms. Habbal, since it did not judge or prejudge her criminal guilt, but rather based its decision on the confirmation that the documents that Ms. Habbal submitted contained false statements. B.2. Considerations of the Court B.2.1. Right to nationality and the minimum guarantees of due process in proceedings that may lead to the deprivation of nationality 90. Regarding the right to nationality recognized in Article 20 of the American Convention, the Court has maintained that nationality, “as a legal and political bond that links a person to a particular State, allows the individual to acquire and to exercise the rights and responsibilities inherent in membership in a political community. As such, nationality is a prerequisite for the exercise of certain rights, 114 and is also a non-derogable right according to Article 27 of the Convention. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that nationality is a fundamental right of the human person that is established in other international instruments. 115 It is also worth mentioning that the American Convention includes two aspects of the right to nationality: a) the right to a nationality from the perspective of endowing the individual with the basic legal protection for a series of relationships by establishing his connection to a specific State, and b) the protection of the individual against the arbitrary deprivation of his nationality because this would deprive him of all his political rights and of those civil rights that are based on a person’s nationality. 116 91. Moreover, this Court has established that nationality, as it is mostly accepted, should be considered a natural condition of the human being. This condition is not only the very basis of his political status but also part of his civil status. Consequently, even though it has traditionally been accepted that the determination and regulation of nationality fall within the competence of each State, developments in this area reveal that international law has imposed certain limits on the State’s margin of discretion. 117 In this regard, the Court has considered that the determination of its nationals continues to be subject to the internal jurisdiction of the States. Nevertheless, this State attribute must be exercised in conformity Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 137, and Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 253. 114 115 Cf. Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 253. Cf. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, para. 34, and Case of Dominicans and Haitians expelled v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 254. 116 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra, para. 32, and Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 255. 117 30