35. In the present Judgment of Interpretation in the case of the Castro Castro Prison, the Court clarified the consultation made to it with regard to the determination of victims and the right to measures of reparation (paras. 62-70), but it did not do the same, satisfactorily, as obiter dicta, with regard to the central matter of the State’s request for interpretation. A public hearing was not held, and with this it has lost an opportunity to deal in detail with the referred matter presented to it, which today occupies a central position in the contemporary international agenda of human rights. 36. In my opinion, Article 67 of the American Convention perfectly empowers the Court to clarify the matters presented to it by all the procedural or intervening parties (the appellant State, the legal representative and common intervener of the victims, the attorneys of the “Canto Grande 92 Group” of victims, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as well as the IDL and the CNDH). Articles 29(3) and 59 of the Rules of Procedure may also be considered the grounds for said clarification. Besides, Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure determines that the Court will decide upon the requests for interpretation through a judgment, which will include the legal substantiation (Article 55(1)(f) of the Rules of Procedure). The Convention also states that the Judgments of the Court must be substantiated. Likewise, Article 44 of the Rules of Procedures empowers the Court "in any state of the case,” to require “any measure of investigation" (evidence, report, expert opinion, information, opinion, or any other). 37. Given the importance of the matters set forth in the present proceedings of the Interpretation of a Judgment, including the appellant State’s main concern, I requested in vain to the Court, through letters addressed to its Secretariat on 06.13.2007 and 12.04.2007, the holding of a hearing, because I had issues I wanted to present to the parties. The Court could have summoned it – it can do so “in any state of the case” and even in the stage of supervision of compliance of the Judgment, - to better conduct the proceedings. It did not do so, and its majority was pleased with a reasoning that, in my opinion, could be more elaborate and satisfactory. VI. Reason and Persuasion. 38. I allow myself to take up again the consideration of Aeschylus, in The Eumenides, in 458 a.C., regarding the need of prevalence of reason and persuasion of what if fair (cf. supra). In the works, Athena, upon announcing the creation “for all times” of the court of Areopagus, - the first permanent court of the old world, responsible for judging murders, - considered it necessary to explain the basic reasons for her decision. Athena did not exempt herself from the task of conviction, persuasion, and she considered: (treaty-making power), were never an exclusive monopoly of the States. For examples (of treaties celebrated by human communities, from ancient times up to the Westphalia Peace of 1648), cf., v.g., A. Truyol and Serra, Histoire du Droit international public, Paris, Economica, 1995, pp. 5-7 and 13-14; P. Guggenheim, Traité de Droit international public, 2a. ed. rev., volume I, Genève, Georg & Cie., 1967, pp. 114-115; R. Ago, "Les premières collectivités interétatiques méditerranéennes", in Mélanges offerts à P. Reuter - Le Droit international: unité et diversité, Paris, Pedone, 1981, pp. 22-23 and 29-30. – This is additional historical information in defense of my position, held throughout the years in this Court (cf., inter alia, my Concurring Opinion in OC-16), of the humanization of International Law; cf., more recently, A.A. Cançado Trindade, A Humanização do Direito Internacional, Belo Horizonte/Brasil, Edit. Del Rey, 2006, pp. 3-409.