creative one, respectively, of the exercise of the international judicial function. I consider it more appropriate to characterize them in another way, as the judicial selflimitation, which I consider completely inadequate for an international human rights court, and the judicial impartiality, which I have defended for years within this Court, in the search for the realization of justice. These different conceptualizations have been reflected, throughout the years, in the Court’s work in matters of the Interpretation of Judgments. 43. I already referred to the extraordinary contribution, acknowledged internationally, given by the Inter-American Court to the evolution of International Human rights Law itself, through its Interpretation of the Judgment in the case of Barrios Altos (supra). There is a sensible distance between the Court’s position of judicial impartiality in the Interpretation of the Judgment in the case of Barrios Altos, which has won it the international acknowledgment of the most lucid doctrine on international law, and the restrictive predisposition that can be clearly concluded, v.g., from paragraphs 25-26 of the present Judgment of Interpretation in the case of the Castro Castro Prison.23 44. I allow myself to recall here another example of the Court’s jurisprudence. In its Interpretation of a Judgment (of 10.01.1999) in the case of Blake versus Guatemala, the Inter-American Court recalled the prevailing criterion in the international jurisprudence in this regard, according to which the interpretation of a judgment implies not only the precision of that decided by the Tribunal, but also the determination of the scope, the sense, and the purpose of the decision, pursuant to the considerations that motivated it (para. 18). 45. The Court considered that, even though they were “clear in the scope and content” of that stated in their previous Judgment on reparations in the case of Blake, it was “useful to explain the matters presented by the State in order to dispel any doubt” in this sense.24 In effect, even though the judgment of a tribunal is final and not susceptible to modifications, nothing prevents its purpose from provoking any matter in the form of a request presented to the tribunal for the interpretation of said judgment.25 46. "Sense" and "scope" are not, in my opinion, suitable for a dogmatic or restrictive predetermination, which leads to a single, standard conclusion. On the contrary, the “sense” is the understanding or reason formed when distinguishing something, regarding which an opinion or interpretation is issued.26 The "scope" refers . Once the Court declared the admissibility of all the requests for interpretation (both of the appellant State and the legal representatives – different to the common intervener – of a group of victims), it had to clarify all the matters presented to it, instead of formulating the warning – without cost -, in the cas d'espèce – of the mentioned paragraphs 25-26 of the present Judgment. 23 . 24 Reimbursement of expenses in the processing of the case. . S. Rosenne, Interpretation, Revision and Other Recourse from International Judgments and Awards, Leiden, Nijhoff (Series "International Litigation in Practice", vol. I), 2007, pp. 1 and 4-5. 25 . Cf. Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la Lengua Española, 21a. ed., volume I, Madrid, R.A.E., 1992, p. 1864; Diccionario Océano de la Lengua Española, Barcelona, Ed. Océano, [2003], pp. 1023-1024; G. Gómez de Silva, Breve Diccionario Etimológico de la Lengua Española, México, El Colegio de México/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996 [5a. reimpr.], p. 634. 26