SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA-RAMÍREZ IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE OF LA CANTUTA, OF NOVEMBER 29, 2006 THE COURT’S CASE LAW ON SELF-AMNESTY 1. The Court has repeatedly addressed the issue posed by the so-called “self-amnesty” laws. The Court first dealt with this issue directly in the Judgment on reparations in the Case of Castillo-Páez (November 27, 1998) in connection with orders issued by the very same State at which this Judgment is directed; it was also addressed in the Judgment on reparations handed down in the Case of Loayza-Tamayo (also dated September 27, 1998); and, lastly –at a first stage of definitions and clarifications— the issue was analyzed in the widely known and cited Judgment rendered in the Case of Barrios Altos (March 14, 2001). I have expressed my views on this issue in successive separate Opinions, starting with the one I wrote for the aforementioned Case of Castillo-Páez. I will refer to my statements in such cases. 2. In recent times, the Court’s case law on this issue has been articulated in two judgments fashioned along the same lines, which, basically, uphold the Court’s findings in the aforementioned decisions: the Case of Almonacid-Arellano et al. (Judgment of September 26, 2006) and the Case of La Cantuta. No changes have been introduced as to the substance of the matter; these judgments merely incorporate clarifications or characterizations that perhaps can be attributed to the peculiarities of each case. The Court has thus established what can be referred to as the “Inter-American view on self-amnesty,” which has been expressly embraced by the judgments of several domestic courts. This has consolidated, both at the international and domestic level, a standard that, when first entertained, represented a major sign of innovation, and which has now been turned into an increasingly known, recognized and applied guarantee in the system of human rights protection. 3. To sum up, the Inter-American Court’s position on this issue upholds: a) the full force and effect of the obligations to respect rights and ensure their exercise, under Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), notwithstanding any domestic-law obstacles that might hinder due compliance with such obligations that the State has undertaken, acting in its sovereign capacity, upon becoming a party to the Convention; b) the resulting eradication of the impunity that such obstacles might allow in connection with particularly egregious crimes; and c) the State’s duty to adopt, at the domestic law level, such measures as may be required to enforce said duties and root out impunity, pursuant to the provisions of Article 2 of the ACHR. 4. At some point, a question arose concerning the means through which the State should do away with any such laws that are in conflict with the American Convention on Human Rights. Abrogation? Invalidation or unenforceability by way of judicial or administrative interpretation? Nullification? It is not the Inter-American Court’s but the State’s place to answer this question, i.e. to analyze and implement the decision that will lead to the intended end, which is the elimination of any potential effect of a legal provision that is incompatible with the Convention.