3 buildings, any means of communication or transport, power or transmission towers, power plants or any other property or services, using weapons or explosive material or devices, or any other means capable of causing havoc or serious disturbance to peace or disruption of international relations or the safety of the public and the Government, shall be punished with no less than twenty years’ imprisonment.” (In bold in the original). 8. In the first place, I shall now turn attention to the main verbs defining the conduct that constitutes this crime. On the one hand, the crime is committed when a person “causes, creates or maintains” a state of intimidation, alarm or fear among the population, or in any segment thereof. On the other, whoever “commits acts” against the life, physical integrity, health, freedom or safety of any person, or against property or the safety of certain property, also engages in terrorism. These acts are independent of one another. In addition, they must be committed using any means capable of causing certain consequences: havoc or serious disturbance of the peace, or disruption of international relations or the safety of the public and the Government. 9. The description of the crime fails to make any reference to the voluntary aspect of the action, thus omitting something I believe to be much more important inasmuch as it is what distinguishes terrorism from other crimes: the notion that terrorismrelated acts carry more severe penalties because they are committed, as their name implies, with the purpose of causing terror. Under the language of Article 2, it would be possible to hold, for instance, that damaging a means of transport with any means or devices capable of causing havoc constitutes terrorism. This interpretation shows the broad scope of the criminal definition and the ensuing discretion conferred upon the judge to turn a crime against property into terrorism, thereby seriously prejudicing the accused. 10. In my view, this reason is enough to hold that Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 24.575 does not comply with the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle required by Article 9 of the American Convention and, therefore, the same is true for Articles 4 and 5 of the aforesaid Decree. In addition, I believe that the foregoing is further supported by the decision delivered by the Constitutional Court of Peru after the facts giving rise to the proceedings and the condemnatory judgment against Mr. García-Asto. 11. On January 3, 2003, the Constitutional Court of Peru ruled on a constitutional motion filed regarding several articles of Decree-Laws Nos. 24.575 and 25.659. In its judgment, the Court held that the criminal offenses described in both Decree-Laws (terrorism and high treason or aggravated terrorism) “could indistinctly fall within one crime or the other, depending on the criteria of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the respective judges,” adding that the imprecise distinction between both crimes affected the legal status of the accused in many ways. The Court based this opinion on paragraph 119 of the judgment rendered by the Inter-American Court in the Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al. and on the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia principle enshrined in Article 2(24)(d) of the Peruvian Political Constitution. Given the decision made by the Constitutional Court, it would logically follow that these statutory definitions of crimes would be held unconstitutional so that new ones could be drafted in a manner such that they would fully comply with the