Principles for the Search of Disappeared Persons state that the authorities responsible should launch the search on their own initiative, even when no formal complaint or request has been made;79 that “the search for the disappeared persons and the criminal investigation of those responsible for the disappearance should be mutually reinforcing,” and “the comprehensive search of the disappeared persons should be initiated and conducted with the same effectiveness as the criminal investigation.”80 76. In the present case, the Court finds that the State has not carried out effective judicial or administrative actions that would locate the whereabouts of Mr. Garzón Guzmán. For example, before initiating the judicial investigation in 2011, the authorities only presented hypotheses, such as Mr. Garzón Guzmán had disappeared at the hands of members of a subversive group or had left the country. In addition, they never investigated the police installations where Mr. Garzón Guzmán might have been detained. The activities deployed by the State were limited to check whether the authorities had someone detained with that name and to visit clinics, hospitals and the morgue. All of this indicates that Mr. Garzón Guzmán had already been without the protection of the law during the time that he was tortured after being detained (supra para. 43). 77. Therefore, the Court concludes that the State violated its obligation to conduct, with due diligence, a serious, coordinated and systematic search for the victim until it could determine with certainty his fate or his whereabouts, which also constitutes a violation of the right to access to justice to the detriment of his next of kin. 78. For its part, the representative argued that Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles I and II of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disapperance of Persons, had been violated because, as of the date of the event, the forced disappearance of persons had not been defined as an offense in Ecuador. 79. The Court has repeatedly referred to the States’ general obligation to adapt their domestic legal order to the standards of the American Convention. In this specific case that obligation is related to the terms of Article III of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, which establishes the obligation to define as an autonomous offense the forced disappearance and to define the punishable conducts that comprise the offense.81 80. In 2014, the offense of forced disappearance was introduced into Ecuadorian law by Article 84 of the Integral Organic Criminal Code (hereinafter COIP), which establishes: Force disappearance. – A State agent or whoever acts with his consent, who by any means, deprives a person of his freedom, followed by a lack of information or the refusal to recognize the deprivation of freedom or to inform on the wherabouts or fate of a person that would impede the exercise of the constitutional or legal guarantees, shall be punished with a sanction of 22 to 26 years in prison.82 Observations on the Report submitted by Honduras under Article 29(1) of the Convention, UN Doc. CED/C/HND/CO/1, May 25, 2018, para. 30(f) and Committee against Enforced Disappearances, Final Observations on the Report submitted by Chile under Article 29(1) of the Convention, UN Doc. CED/C/CHL/CO/1, Arpil 18, 2019, para. 27(a). Cf. Committee against Enforced Disappearances, Guiding Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons, UN Doc. CED/C/7. Principle 6. 79 Cf. Committee against Enforced Disappearances. Guiding Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons, UN Doc. CED/C/7. Principle 13. 80 Cf. Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 181 and Case of Vásquez Durand et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 174. 81 82 Article 84 of the Integral Organic Criminal Code. Official Registry, Supplement 180 of February 10, 2014. 20