92. The Inter-American Court has held that the right of presumption of innocence implies that the defendant does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is accused, because the onus probandi (burden of proof) is on those who have made the accusation.94 Hence, irrefutable demonstration of guilt is an essential requirement for punishment, so the burden of proof falls on the prosecutor and not the accused.95 On this, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has established as follows: The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.96 93. For its part, the Inter-American Commission has pointed out the following: In this context, another elementary concept of criminal processal [Tr. procedural] law, the objective of which is to preserve the principle of innocence, is the burden of proof. In criminal proceedings, the onus probandi does not lie with the accused; on the contrary, it is the State that has to demonstrate the accused's guilt. Modern doctrine accordingly maintains that "the accused does not need to prove his innocence, which has already been constructed by the presumption protecting him, but rather the accuser has to fully construct his position, leading to certainty that a punishable act was committed.97 94. In the instant case, the IACHR observes that the signed statements of January 21, 1997 and July 31, 1997 were rendered without Mr. Cortez having professional legal counsel and without him knowing the specific charges against him, which in itself is sufficient to establish violation of Articles 8.2.b and c of the Convention. 95. At the same time, as regards presumption of innocence, the IACHR notes that, although on November 23, 1998, the military prosecutor of the First Air Force Division issued an opinion requesting the dismissal of proceedings against Mr. Cortez because he had not participated in the illegal deed, on the same day the Court of Law of the First Air Force Division issued a summons for the second phase of the lawsuit (llamamiento a Plenario), including Mr. Cortez. The Commission considers that, given the existence of a prosecutor's opinion establishing that a person being tried did not participate in the fact under investigation, the presumption of innocence principle requires very special substantiation of the reasons why it was admissible to continue the criminal proceedings against that person instead of granting the request for dismissal of proceedings contained in the legal opinion of the prosecution. That substantiation is not to be found in the ruling referred to. Therefore, the IACHR considers that continuing the criminal proceedings against Mr. Cortez violated the presumption of innocence, 96. In light of the foregoing considerations, the IACHR concludes that the Ecuadorian State is responsible for violating the rights established in Articles 8.2, 8.2.b, and 8.2.d of the American Convention, in conjunction with the obligations established in Article 1.1 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Cortez 3. Regarding the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time 97. The Court has established that “the reasonable time referred to in Article 8(1) of the Convention should be assessed in relation to the total duration of the criminal proceedings against an accused, until the final judgment is handed down” and that, in this regard, the time begins to count when the first judicial decision is I/A Court HR. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, par. 154. I/A Court HR. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, par. 182. 96 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32. Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial CCPR/C/GC/32. August 23, 2007, par. 30. 97 IACHR, Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Fernando Mejía Egocheaga and Raquel Martín de Mejía, Peru, March 1, 1996. 94 95 18