16. Therefore, the Court is empowered to hear and reproach possible breaches of this commitment (obligation of progressivity and non-regression) of the rights that, interpretatively, could be derived from the aforementioned Charter, not to establish autonomously the international responsibility of States for individual violations of such rights. 17. It should also be borne in mind that Article 26 only mentions the OAS Charter and not the American Declaration, so it is this first instrument that must be taken into account to determine which ESCER could be interpretatively derived therefrom in order to supervise observance of the aforementioned duty of the State. 18. However, as can be seen from reading the Charter, it does not provide a catalog of rights nor does it define their content; rather, it formulates objectives, i.e., goals to be achieved in this area. The right to work, and unlike other ESCER, contains express reference. However, its scope is not fully developed; for example, it is not stated whether or not the right to work includes job stability. Beyond these interpretative difficulties, the fact is that Article 26 only empowers the Court to carry out the general supervision already explained and, moreover, the Protocol provides the Court with the opportunity to exercise its contentious jurisdiction only with respect to two ESCER. The instant judgment simply chooses to ignore the existence of Article 19 of the Protocol, but this omission does not operate to repeal the rule. As long as it remains in force, this provision reflects the expression of the will of the States. 19. In line with the above, conceiving Article 26 of the Convention as a rule referring to all ESCER that would be included in the Charter of the OAS disregards the commitment adopted by the States Parties and generates uncertainty with respect to the catalog of rights justiciable before the Court, which has at least two consequences. The first is that, by not knowing the specific rights that could be affected by their actions, States Parties cannot prevent or remedy possible violations domestically. The second is that a rationale that ignores the express text of the Treaty (the Convention and its Protocol) affects the legitimacy of the Tribunal's decisions, since it reflects a low standard of reasoning, which subsequently makes it difficult to examine the conduct of the domestic authorities in the light of a more demanding standard. 20. It is therefore necessary to distinguish two distinct, related, but different levels of adjudication. One is at the national level, where, through democratic procedures, citizens decide to translate ESCER into their respective legal systems, also incorporating international law on this matter, as is the case in the vast majority of member states of the Inter-American Human Rights System. In this context, it is the national courts that -within the scope of their authority- exercise their powers regarding the interpretation and justiciability of these rights, in accordance with their Constitutions and laws. 14