In particular, the action for amparo is inadmissible and shall be rejected outright when it is filed with regard to: a) Legislative acts issued by a public authority, such as organic and ordinary laws, decree-laws, decree, ordinances, statutes, regulations and decisions that are binding (erga omnes), because, in order to suspend their effects owing to violation of the Constitution, in substance or in form, the action on unconstitutionality is the appropriate mechanisms, and this must be filed before the Constitutional Tribunal.150 E. Refusal to admit the remedies of amparo filed by several members of the Constitutional Tribunal who were terminated 101. As already indicated (supra para. 50), according to article 276 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal was competent to rectify the unconstitutional acts of the other branches of the State, and to make a final ruling, on the actions for judicial protection and other jurisdictional guarantees. Five of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal who were removed filed a remedy of amparo against the decision of Congress to remove them from office of November 25, 2004 (supra para. 63). 102. On December 7, 2004, the Twelfth Civil Court of Pichincha issued a decision on the remedy of amparo filed by Luís Vicente Rojas Bajaña, a member of the Constitutional Tribunal who had been terminated. In this decision, it decided “not to admit for processing [the said] constitutional remedy,” based on the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of December 2, 2004, and indicated that, “in this case, the action on unconstitutionality can be filed before the Constitutional Tribunal.”151 103. Likewise, on December 13, 2004, the First Civil Court of Pichincha issued a decision on the remedy of amparo against Resolution No. R-25-160 of the National Congress filed by Miguel Ángel Camba Campos, a member of the Constitutional Tribunal who had been terminated. In this remedy, he argued that the National Congress had removed him by means of a “simple parliamentary resolution” on November 25, 2004, “without respecting due process of law […] established in the Constitution.” In this regard, he indicated that: (i) “[e]ven though the creation of a majority, and the decisions adopted by the National Congress are inherent expressions of the democratic system, the majority is obliged to be particularly faithful to the Constitution […]; (ii) “all the formalities and procedures [had] been complied with […] to ensure that his appointment [as a member of the Constitutional Tribunal] had not only formal validity, but also the legitimacy without which mere formalism has no value”; (iii) the “exercise of the functions of judge […] by legal and constitutional mandate should have a term of four years, which can only be interrupted by an impeachment proceeding that concludes with censure and dismissal”; (iv) “in this case, not only was the filing of objections in the context of the impeachment proceeding prevented [with the termination decision], but matters reached the dangerous extreme of preventing the trial itself, thereby denying any possibility of exercising the right of defense that […] belongs [to] legally appointed judges,” and (v) “there is no legal or constitutional provision that [would] allow the National Congress to remove the members of the Constitutional Tribunal with a mere parliamentary decision; therefore, they c[ould] not do this; such an act, far from constituting an exercise of legislative powers, degenerate[d] into an unlawful administrative act, because […] it [was] not based on any legal provision.”152 150 Cf. Ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 27, 2001 (file of annexes to the report, tome III, folios 1068 and 1069). 151 Cf. Decision of the Twelfth Civil Court of Pichincha of December 7, 2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome III, folios 1073 and 1074). 152 First Civil Court of Pichincha, remedy of amparo of December 13, 2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome III, folios 1076 to 1081). 34