9. Arguments on the right not to be tried twice for the same facts 150. The Commission did not refer specifically to the presumed violation of the right not to be tried twice for the same facts. It merely indicated that “as regards the second vote on impeachment of December 8, 2004, the Commission considers that, according to the information available, it was not a new impeachment, but a repetition of the vote already adopted. In effect, in light of the pressure brought to bear by the President of the Republic by the call to special sessions, the National Congress repeated the vote on impeachment and modified the decision adopted previously on December 1. The information available allows one to conclude that the Congress once again adopted a resolution on a matter already decided without a mechanism being provided for this purpose, and that the victims did not have the opportunity to participate in this proceeding or to exercise their right to defense.” 151. The representatives argued that “the purpose of the impeachment proceeding was to determine the guilt of the defendants for ‘statutory or constitutional infractions in the exercise of their office’; that Article 8(4) of the American Convention applies “not only in the criminal jurisdiction, but also to any sanctions proceeding,” and that if “a motion of guilt is not approved by the National Congress, this is equivalent to an acquittal, [which] cannot be revised by the same body.” 152. The State argued that the special session of December 8, 2003, “was held to rectify and error that had occurred in the session” of December 1, related to a “joinder of motions when the law did not permit this.” 10. Arguments on Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention 153. The Commission argued that “[a]t the time of the events, the National Congress had not enacted the law establishing clearly the causes for impeaching the judges […], nor had it established a procedure that established the norms of due process and guaranteed an adequate defense.” It added that “given the absence of the regulation in Ecuador’s legal system of any other mechanisms that would permit a review of the dismissal decision, the Ecuadorian legal framework did not offer the victims an effective judicial remedy, which resulted in a violation of Article 2 of the American Convention in this case.” 154. The representatives agreed with the Commission and added that, “at the time of the dismissal, Ecuador had not enacted a law in which it established the causes for the dismissal of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal,” nor had it determined “the conducts that would be grounds for dismissal, or established a general procedure.” They added that “even though normative progress has undoubtedly been made, such as the enactment of the 2008 Constitution, and the Organic Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control, […] the political organs still exercise an indirect control over the Constitutional Court by means of the mechanisms for selecting the judges, so that it is relevant to declare a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.” 155. The State asserted that Article 2 had not been violated, because “a public policy was underway in relation to the protection of human rights and the re-engineering of the administration of justice, the first signs of which could be seen in the 1998 Constitution, the Organic Law on the Council of the Judicature, and the Law on Constitutional Control, which was developed, strengthened and consolidated in the 2008 Constitution, the Organic Code on the Judicial Function, and the Organic Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control.” It indicated that, “in relation to the general obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 […], the Ecuadorian State [had complied] with these, because […] the 45