and issued favorable reports to file actions on unconstitutionality.” Regarding the “result of the remedy,” it argued that the action on unconstitutionality “incorporated the appropriate response to this situation: the total or partial suspension, as appropriate, of the effects of the resolution,” with “the total suspension of the effects as a reparatory aspect.” Lastly, regarding the presumed lack of impartiality of the new Constitutional Tribunal, it considered that “the situation of political necessity clearly revealed a crisis with juridical elements of instability; hence collateral damage to the population could have arisen if the situation concerning the appointment of the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal had not been rectified.” 12. Arguments on equality 160. The Commission considered that the alleged facts “do not characterize a possible violation [of] Article […] 24 of the American Convention.” 161. The representatives argued that the State “discriminated against the judges at two moments: (i) when it removed one group of judges and not another, and (ii) when it left the judges without access to the constitutional guarantee of the amparo remedy, which was a right of everyone else on the State’s territory.” 162. Regarding the first action, the representatives added that “the National Congress treated the two groups of judges who were in equal conditions differently.” According to the representatives, “the Government considered one group corrupt, inept, incompetent to exercise their functions, and considered that the other group, who were pro-government, could continue to exercise their functions.” In addition, the representatives argued that “the motive [for the termination of some judges and not others] […] was the perception of the parliamentary majority that the judges responded to political directives,” and they underlined that “the result of this differentiated treatment materialized in the annulment of the right to exercise public office.” 163. Regarding the second action, the representatives stated that “the Constitution of Ecuador [had established] that everyone, without distinction, ha[d] the right to file an action for amparo, solely based on the fact that they felt that their rights were being violated.” The representatives argued, regarding the resolution of December 2, 2004, under which access to the remedy of amparo was denied, that “although it could be interpreted […] as a general decision that could affect anyone who decided to file an action for amparo against a resolution of the National Congress, the title of the resolution alluded to the action for which the judges were removed” (namely, resolution No. 25-160 of November 25, 2004). The representatives added that the criterion used to make this differentiation “was having been the target of a parliamentary resolution, which should be understood as a prohibited category in the sense of ‘any other difference.” According to the representatives, “the purpose and the result of this differentiation were to annul the right to judicial protection.” The representatives concluded that, “for all these reasons, the Ecuadorian State ha[d] violated Article 24 in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention.” 164. For its part, the State maintained that the affirmation of the representatives of the victims with regard to the discriminatory treatment was “imprecise,” because “the only element that the National Congress had considered was the illegality at the origin of some appointments, and the legality of others […], so that it was the law itself that made the differences.” In addition, the State reiterated that “not all unequal treatment should be considered discrimination” and that, in this case, “the Ecuadorian State had proved that the representatives’ assertions [were] inconsistent and inappropriate in relation to their allegation of discriminatory treatment, because the only factor that the National Congress 47