relation to the D´Hondt method. In this motion it was alleged that the judges had “acted based on their personal interests and to favor those who permitted their election to the Constitutional Tribunal […], to the detriment and prejudice of all the other political organizations that existed in the country [and …], disregarding a formula for calculating proportional representation that permitted plural and democratic political representation, [based on which] they ha[d] jeopardized the next elections, with a dangerous attack on the country’s democratic life, as well as on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.”246 206. Pursuant to Ecuadorian law, it was evident that the opinions provided in the rulings of the judges could not be the reason or grounds for their removal. An analysis of the records of Congress for December 1 and 8 allows this Court to conclude that no mention was made of specific facts relating to grave offenses committed by the judges. It was only their legal decisions that were mentioned. The Court observes that evidence that the impeachment was based on the type of legal decisions that the Constitutional Tribunal was taking within the framework of its competences is the fact that congressman Posso indicated that a letter had been handed to the President of the Constitutional Tribunal “dated February 16, 2004,” and “signed […] by the leaders and heads of a bloc of six or seven political parties: Izquierda Democrática, Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano, Partido Renovador Institucional (PRIAN), Movimiento Pachakutik, Democracia Popular, Movimiento Popular Democrático, and Partido Socialista Frente Amplio,” warning the judges, “before they took the decision, following the complaint filed by the Social Christian Party, of the risks that could result from of a decision to strike down the D’Hondt method at that time; however, this warning […], presented by the majority of the political parties was not taken into account, but rather the eminently political criterion was given priority. Consequently, [… several] members of Congress ha[d] presented a request for impeachment.”247 This is clear evidence of the impairment of judicial independence in this case. 3.3. Institutional aspect of judicial independence, separation of powers, and democracy 207. The Court has made some clarifications about the institutional aspect and the objective dimension of judicial independence (supra paras. 188 to 199). However, in the circumstances of this case, which are different from those of previous cases relating to the arbitrary removal of isolated judges, it is essential to develop in greater detail how the collective termination of judges, particularly of high courts, constitutes an attack not only on judicial independence but also on the democratic order. 208. The Court underscores that the 1998 Constitution included protection of judicial independence as an institutional aspect of the Judiciary (supra para. 49). Indeed, article 199 indicated that “the organs of the Judiciary shall be independent in the exercise of their obligations and attributes. No function of the State may interfere in matters that are exclusive to them.” The Constitution also established that “justices and judges shall be independent in the exercise of their jurisdictional powers, even in relation to the other organs of the Judiciary.” 209. This constitutional article, as well as the referendum held in Ecuador on this issue (supra para. 44), as a result of which it was decided that Congress no longer had the 246 1038). 247 1004). National Congress Record No. 24-326 of December 1, 2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome IIII, folio National Congress Record No. 24-326 of December 1, 2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome III, folio 61