the violation of the political rights of the former employees on the failure to comply with the rules of due process, without referring to its case law on job stability and its corresponding rules; in particular, the criteria for deciding to leave the position or the nature of and the competent judge in disciplinary proceedings. 9. I believe that it would have been preferable to refer exclusively to Article 23 and not to opt for a differentiated analysis that limits the scope of the guarantees regarding compliance of political rights; in particular, access to public service under conditions of equality. Article 23(1)(c) states that “1. Every citizen shall enjoy the rights and opportunities: […] c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country.” The Court determines on this occasion to include an analysis of that article and to declare the violation of the right to access to public service under conditions of equality, understood also as the right to job stability of public servants. Needless to say that the victims in this case, since they were congressional employees, were exercising this right that was not recognized by the State. 10. Thus, as the Court has indicated, in line with General Comment No. 25 of the UN Committee on Human Rights, 32 Article 23(1)(c) does not only ensure the right to have access to public service, but rather it does so under conditions of equality and the right to continue in the position. This implies that criteria and reasonable and objective procedures are respected and ensured for appointments, promotions, suspensions and dismissals and that individuals are not discriminated against during those procedures. 33 This was precisely the obligatory content that was violated in this case, as 184 employees were dismissed from their positions in the absence of a reasonable and objective proceeding. 11. This is not a merely a lexical difference. As I have stated in other separate opinions, the use of Article 26 of the Convention to declare State responsibility is juridically inadequate and affects the legitimacy of the judgment. To determine the responsibility of Peru exclusively from the point of view of Article 23(1)(c) not only responds more precisely to the factual situation and would allow the Court to advance its jurisprudence on the scope of this right, but it would also have avoided affecting the effectiveness of the decision due to the inconsistencies of the direct justiciability of Article 26. Thus, it is once again demonstrated that the use of this provision of the Convention has as its only purpose to reaffirm a jurisprudential line on ESCER, regardless of whether it is pertinent or necessary to ensure justice in the specific case. Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Registrar Cf. United Nations Committee of Human Rights. General Comment No. 25, Article 25: Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 7, July 12, 1996, para. 23. 33 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 206 32 4