By way of context, the petitioner noted that from 1991 to 2000, there did not exist in
Peru any entity to appoint prosecutors and, therefore, the Office of the Attorney General would make
provisional appointments of prosecutors after assessing their qualifications. He explained that
provisional prosecutors performed the same duties as tenured prosecutors, but were removed by the
Office of the Attorney General without any prior proceeding. He also noted that at that time all
prosecutorial positions were of a provisional nature.
In that context, he claimed, he was appointed as Provisional Provincial Deputy
Prosecutor to the Joint Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of La Mar under resolution No. 464-98-MP-CEMP
of June 30, 1998 and that, subsequently, under resolution No. 565-2002-MP-FN of April 8, 2002, he was
appointed as Provisional Provincial Deputy Prosecutor at the Second Provincial Criminal Prosecutor’s
Office of Huamanga. He asserted that he held the position of Prosecutor for five consecutive years and
had never been the subject of any administrative penalty, under the Labor and Administrative Career
Act, earning a monthly salary with the respective withholdings being deducted for benefits.
He noted that under No. 087-2003-MP-FN of January 21, 2003, the Attorney General of
the Nation decided to remove him from his position without citing any grounds to order his removal and
without providing him the opportunity to defend himself. He stated that reference was made in said
decision to a pending complaint and a charge brought against him at the time, of which he was eventually
acquitted through an ordinary proceeding at a later date.
He stated that on February 13, 2003, he filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de
reconsideración) with the same authority, which was denied on February 14, 2003 by the Attorney
General of the Nation on the grounds that his appointment was of a temporary nature.
The petitioner noted that he filed an appeal for constitutional relief via amparo with the
First Specialized Court for Civil Matters of Huamanga, Ayacucho, Peru, which on April 19, 2005 was
denied on the grounds that the act of removal from office did not constitute a dismissal based on issues
of a disciplinary nature, but was instead based on termination of his appointment.
He contended that he appealed to the Civil Chamber of Ayacucho, and on July 11, 2005,
the Specialized Chamber for Civil Matters of the Superior Court of Justice of Ayacucho upheld the decision
of the First Specialized Court finding that the alleged victim could not assert rights to which tenured
prosecutors are entitled. Finally, he filed a petition for constitutional relief for denial of rights (recurso
de agravio constitucional) with the Constitutional Court against the lower appeals court decision, which
was denied on November 14, 2005, on the grounds that provisional status constitutes a situation that
does not give rise to any rights other than those inherent to such a position.
As to the law, the alleged victim claimed violations of his right to a fair trial, freedom
from ex post facto law, judicial protection, work, privacy and equal protection.
With regard to fair trial rights, he argued that the State violated the duty to state
grounds and his right to prior and detailed notification of the charges and to adequate time and means
to prepare for his defense, because he was never advised of any event, situation or accusation against
him, nor were any charges of impropriety or misconduct ever brought, and he was unaware of the
grounds for his dismissal. He further contended that the decision by the Office of the Attorney General of
the Nation to remove him from his position lacks sufficient justification and constituted an arbitrary act.
He contended that the State had failed to enforce Articles 146 and 158 of the Political Constitution or the
Regulations for Organization of the functions of the Higher Prosecutorial Office, which ensure
permanence and tenure of officials provided that their conduct is proper and they discharge their duties
The petitioner alleged that his right to freedom from ex post facto law was violated,
because Law 27362 was applied to him and that this law was approved subsequent to his appointment


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