76. For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has considered that “in a democratic society, both the courts and the investigation authorities must remain free from political pressure.”54 Similarly, in the Case of Kövesi v. Romania, that Court indicated that the dismissal of a prosecutor before the end of his mandate, as well as the reasons that justified the decision, “can hardly be reconciled with the particular consideration to be given to the nature of the judicial function as an independent branch of State power and to the principle of the independence of prosecutors, which — according to Council of Europe and other international instruments — is a key element for the maintenance of judicial independence.”55 77. In the African system the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa stand out. They establish the obligation of States to ensure that “[p]rosecutors are able to perform their professional functions without intimidations, hindrance, harassment, improper interference or unjustified exposure to civil, penal, or other liability.”56 78. It should be pointed out that prosecutors perform functions of agents of justice and, in this capacity, although they are not judges, they need to enjoy guarantees of job stability, among others, as a basic condition for the independence required for the proper fulfilment of their procedural functions.57 79. Ultimately, the Court concludes that, in order to safeguard the independence and objectivity of prosecutors in the exercise of their functions, they are also protected by the following guarantees: (i) of appropriate appointment; (ii) to irremovability from office, and (iii) to be protected from external pressures.58 80. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the independence of prosecutors does not suppose a specific model of institutional organization at the constitutional or legal level, due both to the position that has been recognized to the Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Prosecution Service or any other name used in the internal legal system of each State, and to the organization and internal relationships of such institutions, 59 in the understanding that, his or her decisions not on the basis of the law but with the idea to please those who will re-appoint him or her.” Cf. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - the Prosecution Service, report adopted at its 85th plenary meeting (Venice, December 17 and 18, 2010), para. 50. Cf. ECHR, Case of Guja v. Moldova [GS], No. 14277/04. Judgment of February 12, 2008, para. 86. The Court has also referred to the Independence that should be required in the investigation in cases of human rights violations. Cf. ECHR, Case of Makaratzis v. Greece [GS], No. 50385/99. Judgment of December 20, 2004, para. 73; Case of Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GS], No. 24014/05. Judgment of April 14, 2005, para. 217, and Case of Petrović v. Serbia, No. 40485/08. Judgment of October 15, 2014, para. 73, among others. 54 55 Cf. ECHR, Case of Kövesi v. Romania, No. 3594/19. Judgment of August 5, 2020, para. 208. Cf. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted as part of the activities report of the African Commission at its Second Summit and Meeting of Heads of State of the African Union held in Maputo from July 4 to 12, 2003, Principle F(a)2. 56 57 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 94. 58 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 95. A general overview of the basic regulation of the functions of prosecutors in the States that have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court results in the following classification: (1) States in which these functions are exercised by autonomous institutions whose internal organization is subject to the principle of hierarchy: (i) Argentine Republic, National Public Prosecution Service (Articles 120 of the Constitution and 2 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (ii) Plurinational State of Bolivia, Public Prosecution Service (Article 225 of the Constitution); (iii) Republic of Chile, Public Prosecution Service (Article 83 of the Constitution); (iv) Republic of El Salvador, Office of the Prosecutor General (Articles 191 of the Constitution and 5 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (v) Republic of Guatemala, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 251 of the Constitution and 5 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (vi) Republic of Honduras, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 1 and 5 of the Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (vii) Republic of Nicaragua, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 59 22