The other, distinct, is the international level. As an international court, the role of the Inter-American Court on this level is to decide whether a State, whose responsibility is claimed, has or has not violated one or more of the rights established in the treaty. As has been explained, in light of the normative design of the Convention and in accordance with its Article 26, the Court is empowered to establish the international responsibility of a State if it has not complied with its obligations of progressive development and of non-retrogression, but not of the ESCER considered individually. In that context, nothing prevents the Court from considering the economic, social and cultural dimensions of the rights contemplated in the norms of the Convention and to exercise its adjudicatory jurisdiction by means of connectivity. That was how the Court proceeded in cases prior to Lagos del Campo v. Peru (2017); for example, in Ximenes Lopes Brazil (2006); 17 Gonzáles Lluy et al. v. Ecuador 18 (2015) and Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala (2016) 19 and that constitutes the correct doctrine to follow. Subsequent to Lagos del Campo, the Court has been upholding the direct justiciability of ESCR on the basis of Article 26, except in Rodríguez Revolorio v. Guatemala (2019) and Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia (2020). II.3 Interpretation of the Convention and its Protocol With respect to the system of interpretation applicable to the norms of a convention, the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention must be followed, which implies considering good faith, the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and its object and purpose as elements of interpretation. From this final element – as Cecilia Medina points out – two specific criteria of the hermeneutic of human rights treaties are derived: their dynamic nature and pro persona, which enable the judges to entertain a “wide margin for a highly creative interpretation.” 20 One of the most relevant canons of interpretation in the international law of human rights is evolutive interpretation. Thus, for example, the Court, in Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, broadened the definition of victim to include both the direct and the indirect victim (family members of Efraín Bámaca, on the one hand, and Jennifer Harbury, on the other). This evolutive interpretation is faithful to the intention of the States Parties. However, here the Court does not apply that interpretive criterion, but rather assumes its jurisdiction in areas that the respective instruments have not conferred upon it; in other words, without the States having consented to it. Stated differently, it is an error to employ the use of these hermeneutical tools as a basis to artificially broaden the jurisdiction of the Court in view of the express norm that precisely and clearly limits it. The judgment makes reference to one provision of the Protocol -the right to work established in Article 6 (paragraph 113)-, but it omits any allusion to a basic norm, Article 19, on the mechanisms of protection recognized in the treaty. This omission is relevant because Article 19 defines two types of mechanisms of protection. One general –applicable to all the rights recognized in the Protocolconsisting of the examination, observations and recommendations that the different Mr. Ximenes Lopes died in a psychiatric institution approximately two hours after having been medicated by the clinical director of the hospital and without having been seen by a doctor. He was not given adequate care and was, because of the care at the mercy of aggression and accidents that could have put his life in danger. The Court found state responsibility for the violation of the rights to life and personal integrity. 18 In this case, which concerned a child infected with the HIV virus upon receiving a blood transfusion, the Court protected the right to health of the victim by means of a connection with the rights to life and to personal integrity, by declaring “the obligation to monitor and supervise the provision of health care within the framework of the right to personal integrity and of the obligation not to endanger life.” 19 The victim was a woman with a disability deprived of liberty who was not given adequate health care for her multiple illnesses and who finally died in prison. This lack of health care resulted in the Court declaring the violation of the rights to life and to personal integrity. 20 MEDINA, “The American Convention on Human Rights” (2018:115). 17 5