83. This Court, as other international courts, has repeatedly indicated that a condemnatory judgment may constitute per se a form of compensation for nonpecuniary damage46. However, owing to the grave circumstances of the instant case, the intensity of the sufferings that the respective facts caused the victim and which, to some extent, also caused suffering to his next of kin, the changes in the lives of the victim’s next of kin and the other consequences of a non-pecuniary nature caused to the latter, the Court considers that it should order payment of fair compensation for the concept of non-pecuniary damage47. 84. When considering and establishing the reparations for non-pecuniary damage, the Court has taken into consideration the different types of non-pecuniary damage referred to by the representatives of the victim and his next of kin and the Commission: the physical and psychological sufferings endured directly by the victim and the physical and psychological sufferings endured by the victim’s next of kin owing to the detention, torture, denial of justice, lack of investigation into the facts and punishment of those responsible, and the lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of Mr. Trujillo Oroza’s remains. 85. As the Court has indicated, the non-pecuniary damage inflicted on the victim is evident, since it is human nature that any person subjected to aggression and illtreatment, such as that endured by José Carlos Trujillo Oroza (unlawful detention, torture and death), experiences profound mental suffering, which extends to the closest members of his family, particularly those who had close affective contact with the victim48. “It is not necessary to prove that this damage has been produced and the acknowledgement of responsibility made [by Bolivia] at the appropriate time is sufficient”49. 86. The right to compensation for the damage suffered by the victim up until the time of his death is transmitted by succession to his heirs50 (supra para. 56), and the 46 cf. Cantoral Benavides case. Reparations, supra note 3, para. 57; The case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, supra note 5, para. 166; and Cesti Hurtado case. Reparations, supra note 3, para. 51. Similarly, cf. Eur. Court HR, Ruiz Torija v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, para. 33; Eur. Court HR, Boner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-B, para. 46; Eur. Court HR, Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 27 October 1994, Series A no. 297-C, para. 45; Eur. Court H.R., Darby judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 187, para. 40; Eur. Court H.R., Wassink judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185-A, para. 41; Eur. Court H.R., Koendjbiharie judgment of 25 October 1990, Series A no. 185-B, para. 34; and Eur. Court H.R., McCallum judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 183, para. 37. 47 cf. Cantoral Benavides case. Reparations, supra note 3, para. 57; The case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, supra note 5, para. 167; and Cesti Hurtado case. Reparations, supra note 3, para. 51. 48 cf. The “White Van” case (Paniagua Morales et al.). Reparations, supra note 4, paras. 106, 124, 142, 157 and 173; Castillo Páez case. Reparations, supra note 29, para. 86; and Loayza Tamayo case. Reparations, supra note 31, para. 138. 49 Garrido and Baigorria case. Reparations, supra note 36, para. 49. Similarly, cf. The “White Van” case (Paniagua Morales et al.). Reparations, supra note 4, paras. 106, 124, 142, 157 and 173; Castillo Páez case. Reparations, supra note 29, para. 86; and Loayza Tamayo case. Reparations, supra note 31, para. 138. 50 cf. The “Street Children” case (Villagrán Morales et al.). Reparations, supra note 3, para. 67; The “White Van” case (Paniagua Morales et al.). Reparations, supra note 4, para. 84; and Neira Alegría et al. case. Reparations, supra note 28, para. 60.