SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CHARLES N. BROWER 1. I share the views expressed by a distinguished Judge Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice regarding the role of the Judge Ad Hoc: While “exercis[ing] his powers impartially and conscientiously,” he has the special obligation to endeavour to ensure that, so far as is reasonable, every relevant argument in favour of the party that has appointed him has been fully appreciated in the course of collegial consideration and, ultimately, is reflected – though not necessarily accepted – in any separate or dissenting opinion that he may write.1 Hence I write, initially, for the purpose of discharging the latter, public part of my duties. I write as well, however, to suggest a further basis of the Court’s jurisdiction here in respect of acts antedating July 27, 1993, the date of Bolivia’s acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction pursuant to Article 62(1) of the Convention.2 2. As to the first, I have joined fully in the Judgment, since I find it, as a whole, and considering all of the circumstances, to be correct and equitable. It respects the laudable facts of Bolivia’s unreserved acceptance, from the very beginning of proceedings before the Commission,3 of responsibility for the acts giving rise to this case; its express written apology addressed to the mother of the victim; the candor with which it has addressed the difficulties that have been encountered as regards the investigations conducted in Bolivia; and its preparedness to enter into discussions looking towards an amicable settlement of reparations, an offer regrettably not taken up by the victim’s family. It is evident that Bolivia would have preferred that the remedies ordered in this Judgment be substantially more modest in both scope and degree. I am satisfied, however, viewing the matter “impartially and conscientiously” as I am bound to do,4 that the developed jurisprudence of the Court, applied to the entire record before it in this case, could not have contemplated less. 3. As to the second, it will be recalled that in the Blake Case,5 as here, the disappearance of the victim antedated the State’s formal acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. Unlike Bolivia in the present case, however, that State asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction as a result. The Court concluded that such objection was “without merit insofar as it relate[d] to effects and actions subsequent to” the State’s acceptance of jurisdiction, and hence that the Court was “competent to examine the possible violations which the Commission impute[d] to the Government in connection with those effects and actions”.6 1 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 409 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). 2 American Convention on Human Rights, hereinafter “the Convention”. 3 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, hereinafter “the Commission”. 4 Pursuant to Articles 10(5) and 11 of the Statute of the Court I have taken an oath to “exercise my functions as a judge honorably, independently and impartially …” 5 6 I/A Court H.R., Blake Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of July 2, 1996. Series C No. 27. Blake Case (Preliminary Objections), para. 40.