unaware of whether the presumed victims or their representatives had filed an application for habeas data, and no evidence had been submitted to prove this. 44. The State argued that the criminal investigation and the prosecution conducted in the ordinary jurisdiction were not the only remedies that should be considered. It indicated that failure to recognize this represented a grave violation of the principle of the subsidiarity of the inter-American system and the State’s right to defend itself. 45. The Commission noted that, regarding the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court’s case law indicated that this should be filed at the proper procedural moment and that the State must specify clearly the remedies that, in its opinion, were not exhausted. It indicated that the State had not filed the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in its briefs of May and October 2012, and had made no mention of the remedies that should be exhausted when it filed that objection; therefore, it considered that the objection was time-barred. The Commission also indicated that the American Convention did not establish that additional remedies should be exhausted to enable the victims to obtain reparation for facts examined by the pertinent domestic remedies; therefore, an interpretation such as that proposed by the State would not only place a disproportionate burden on the victims, but would be contrary to the provisions of the Convention and the raison d’être of both the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the mechanism of reparation. 46. It argued that the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies related to the facts that were alleged to have violated human rights. The claim for reparations arose from the declaration of the State’s international responsibility; consequently, that claim did not depend on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 47. The representatives stressed that the State had not filed the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies at the proper time. They also indicated that the State’s arguments were inconsistent, because it had also argued that the promulgation of the Amnesty Law prevented the exhaustion of remedies in the domestic jurisdiction. They indicated that the State had indicated that the remedies had been exhausted by the ruling of the Superior Court of Justice of August 18, 1993; thus, in addition to the late filing of the objection, they considered that the State had violated the principle of estoppel by adopting a contradictory procedural position. 48. Lastly, they argued that a writ of habeas data was not an appropriate remedy to establish responsibilities for the arbitrary detention, torture and execution of Vladimir Herzog. The remedy that met this purpose was the investigation and criminal prosecution that had been repeatedly obstructed by the Brazilian authorities. The representatives argued that the Court should reject the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State. C.2. Considerations of the Court 49. The Court has developed clear standards for the analysis of a preliminary objection based on a presumed failure to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. First, it has interpreted the objection as a means of defense available to the State and, as such, it may be waived either expressly or tacitly. Second, this objection must be filed at the appropriate time so that the State may exercise its right of defense. Third, the Court has asserted that the State that files this objection must specify the domestic remedies that remain to be exhausted and demonstrate that such remedies are applicable and effective. 26 26 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections, para. 88, and Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil, para. 76. 12