34 he could begin his statement and at the end of it, in order to sign it. The State submitted its acquiescence concerning Article 8 of the Convention during the public hearing, after having heard the victims and being able to cross-examine them; the Court therefore finds that these facts have been established. 157. Article 22(19) of the Constitution of Ecuador in force at the time of the facts established that: (e) No one may be punished without a prior trial, or deprived of the right to defense at any stage or level of the proceedings. Any person accused of a criminal offense shall have the right to a defense lawyer, and that the witnesses for the defense shall be obliged to appear; (f) […] No one may be interrogated, even for investigative purposes, by a police authority, by the Attorney General’s Office, or by any other State agency without the assistance of a private defense lawyer or one appointed by the State in cases in which the interested party is unable to appoint his own defense lawyer. Any judicial, pre-trial or administrative procedure that does not comply with this principle lacks probative value. 158. Despite the constitutional norms cited above, Mr. Chaparro did not have a defense lawyer present when he was interrogated by the Police on November 18, 1997. Also, the Court finds that, by preventing Mr. Chaparro’s lawyer from intervening in his pre-trial statement and by requiring Mr. Chaparro to justify his action for juridical protection himself, when he would have preferred his lawyer to do this, the presence of a defense lawyer was a mere formality. Consequently, the State violated the right embodied in Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Chaparro. 159. Furthermore, the Court finds that the attitude of the public defense lawyer assigned to Mr. Lapo was clearly incompatible with the State’s obligation to provide an acceptable defense lawyer to anyone who is unable to defend himself or appoint a private defense lawyer. In particular, the Court underscores that the legal assistance provided by the State must be effective and, to this end, the State must adopt all appropriate measures.97 Consequently, the Court finds that Ecuador violated, to the detriment of Mr. Lapo, the right to have a defense lawyer provided by the State embodied in Article 8(2)(e) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. D) REASONABLE TIME OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 160. The Commission alleged that the criminal proceedings against the victims ended eight years, three months and seven days after it began; in its opinion, this violated the right to a hearing within a reasonable time established in Article 8(1) of the Convention. The representatives presented similar arguments, and the State acquiesced to these claims. 161. Bearing in mind the State’s acquiescence and the criteria established by this Court in relation to the principle of reasonable time,98 the Court agrees with the Commission that the criminal proceedings against Messrs. Chaparro and Lapo exceeded the limits of what is reasonable. Likewise, in keeping with its case law,99 the Court considers that 97 Cf. ECHR, Case of Artico v. Italy, Judgment of 13 May 1980, Application no. 6694/74, paras. 31-37. 98 Cf. Case of La Cantuta, supra note 16, para. 149; and Case of Ximenes Lopes, supra note 17, para. 196. 99 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 142; Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 160, and Case of Gómez Palomino v. Peru. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 136, para. 85.