27 that Mr. Lapo did not file an appeal. However, it finds that, by requiring that those detained must appeal the mayor’s decisions in order for their case to be heard by a judicial authority, the State is placing obstacles to a recourse that should, due to its nature, be simple. In addition, the law established that the mayor was obliged to decide the recourse within 48 hours, and forward the case documents to the Constitutional Court if the latter requested this, within a similar period. This means that the detained person had to wait at least four days for the Constitutional Court to hear his case. If it is also considered that the law did not establish a time limit for the Constitutional Court to take a decision on the appeal, and that this court was the only judicial body competent to hear appeals from throughout the country against the denial of habeas corpus, we can conclude that the requirement that the recourse be decided “without delay” established in Article 7(6) of the Convention is not respected. Lastly, the detained person is not brought before the Constitutional Court; consequently this body cannot verify his situation and, thus, guarantee his rights to life and personal integrity.72 130. Based on the above and bearing in mind the State’s acquiescence, the Court declares that Ecuador violated Article 7(6) of the Convention, in relation to Article 2 thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Lapo, which, in turn, represents a violation of his right to personal liberty, embodied in Article 7(1) of the Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee rights embodied in Article 1(1) thereof. b) Action for juridical protection or habeas corpus prescribed by law 131. On April 13, 1998, Mr. Lapo filed an action for juridical protection before the Guayaquil Superior Court of Justice, indicating that he had been “deprived of his liberty unlawfully, because the case file does not show any procedural reason that would make the precautionary measure applicable.”73 On May 14, 1998, the Superior Court rejected the recourse stating that “there is no evidence of any violation of procedure that would affect the appellant’s rights.”74 132. On May 12, 1998,75 Mr. Chaparro filed an action for juridical protection before the same Superior Court, stating that “if the requirements established in art. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [(supra para. 104)] to deprive [him] of [his] liberty have been totally invalidated, it is evident that this deprivation of liberty has become unlawful and, consequently, [he] request[ed] that it be revoked and that the injustice being committed 72 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 35. This paragraph states that: In order for habeas corpus to achieve its purpose, which is to obtain a judicial determination of the lawfulness of a detention, it is necessary that the detained person be brought before a competent judge or tribunal with jurisdiction over him. Here habeas corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a person’s life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and in protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment or treatment. See also, Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 63, and Case of La Cantuta, supra note 16, para. 111. 73 Cf. action for juridical protection filed on April 13, 1998, by Freddy Hernán Lapo Íñiguez (judicial case file, volume 72, folio 9227). 74 Cf. judgment of May 13, 1998, delivered by the Superior Court of Justice of Guayaquil (judicial case file, volume 72, folios 9295 and 9296). 75 The Commission mistakenly indicated that the date on which Mr. Chaparro filed the action for juridical protection was May 20, 1988 (file on merits, volume I, folio 87).