59 277. Moreover, even though the representatives submitted the documentation requested (supra para. 11), they did not include precise details of all the items for which reimbursement was requested, or the total amount they requested the Court to establish. It was only following two communications from the Court that the representatives finally submitted the total amount of their claim. In this regard, the Court considers that it is not sufficient to remit probative documents; rather the parties must develop the reasoning that relates the evidence to the fact under consideration, and, in the case of alleged financial disbursements, the items and their justification must be described clearly. 278. The representatives requested reimbursement of the sum of US$235,813.21 (two hundred and thirty-five thousand eight hundred and thirteen United States dollars and twenty-one cents) to Mr. Chaparro and US$9,941.55 (nine thousand nine hundred and forty-one United States dollars and fifty-five cents) to Mr. Lapo for legal advice and representation and the procedural costs they incurred during the proceedings in the domestic sphere and in these international proceedings. In turn, Mr. Lapo provided a statement of expenses that exceeds the amount requested by the representatives, and indicated that he had not kept some of the receipts for those expenses. The State requested the Court to “abide by its case law on costs and expenses and establish reasonable amounts based on the equity principle.” 279. From the documentation provided, it can be seen that the victims agreed with their representatives that they would pay the latter the sum of US$150,000.00 (one hundred and fifty thousand United States dollars) for professional fees, “when the Ecuadorean State pays the pecuniary reparations that the Inter-American Court orders in favor of Messrs. Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez in its judgment.”181 In this regard, the State declared that “the amount […] ‘agreed’ for the payment of professional fees cannot be recognized by the Inter-American Court in the case of an eventual judgment against the State and, instead, the amount should be established, based on the equity principle, without taking into account the arrangements and conditions under which the lawyers have assumed the legal representation of the alleged victims.” 280. The Court has indicated previously that it does not have competence to rule on the agreements that victims reach with their representatives concerning professional fees.182 However, if, as in the instant case, it is requested that this agreement between the victims and their representatives be assumed by the State, the Court must examine whether the agreed amount is reasonable. In this regard, in Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, the Court stated that the costs “include the various necessary and reasonable expenses that the victim or victims incurred in order to have access to the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights, and these expenses include the fees of those who provide legal assistance.”183 181 Certification issued by the lawyers Xavier A. Flores Aguirre and Pablo J. Cevallos Palomeque on September 20, 2007 (file on merits, volume III, folio 944). 182 Cf. Case of de the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers. Monitoring compliance with judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 22, 2006, sixteenth considering paragraph. 183 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 177, para. 85. Also, in Case of Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, the Court stated that “[w]ith regard to professional fees, it is necessary to bear in mind the characteristics inherent in international human rights proceedings, in which decisions are adopted on the violations of such rights, without examining all the extremes of the implications of these violations, which could involve questions of profit related to the said fees, which are legitimate in themselves, but unrelated to the specific issue of the protection of human rights. Therefore, the Court must decide these claims with restraint. If the Court proceeded otherwise, international human rights litigation would be denatured. Consequently, the Court must apply criteria of equity in these cases.”