opposing resistance at the time of his arrest.” In its report of May 20, 2013, referring to the incident of June 19, 2012, regarding the “driver” who drove Mr. Meléndez Quijano’s sister, the State indicated that the incident consisted in a person who “was driving an armored vehicle of a security agency that transfers currency reacting angrily because the driver failed to yield to him.” In addition, with regard to the allegation that, on June 23, 2012, Mr. Meléndez Quijano’s mother had been followed, it asserted that “it had been verified […] that she had not been followed.” 14 It also indicated, with regard to the incident of July 31, 2012, consisting of the transfer of Mr. Meléndez Quijano’s daughter in a police vehicle (infra considering paragraph 15), that this did not involve a situation of danger, because the beneficiary was driven from the university to her home. Furthermore, regarding the affirmations of the representation of the beneficiaries concerning surveillance actions involving Mr. Meléndez Quijano (infra considering paragraph 17), it explained that: The protection agents responsible for ensuring the safety of [Mr. Meléndez] and his family, as part of the ordinary monitoring to assess the level of supposed risk or danger of the protected person, document his activities […], so that this does not signify that an attempt is being made to obtain negative information on Mr. Meléndez Quijano or his family. 13. In addition to the preceding observations on specific incidents, the State considered, in general, that “the situations described by [the representation of the beneficiaries] lack any basis and attempt to imply that any circumstantial incident that occurs to him or his family is a direct threat to his safety.” 14. The State indicated that the “application [of provisional measures] requires, as basic requirements, extreme gravity and urgency and prevention of irreparable damage to persons,” and noted the “exceptional nature” of provisional measures, which, “owing to their very nature cannot be continued indefinitely,” “countering their purpose and temporary nature.” Based on these considerations, the State “ask[ed that the Court] order that the provisional measures be lifted with regard to all the beneficiaries”. 15. Following the Court’s Order of February 2, 2010, the representation of the beneficiaries indicated that various incidents had occurred in relation to the situation of Mr. Meléndez Quijano and his family members. Thus, Mr. Meléndez affirmed that the following incidents occurred between 2010 and 2012: (a) on January 24, 2010, Andrea Meléndez García, his daughter, received a telephone call “and when answering it, a man’s voice said to her […] ‘you are the daughter of Colonel Meléndez Quijano’ and then hung up”; (b) on March 9, 2010, Gloria de Meléndez, the beneficiary’s mother, was followed by a suspicious vehicle; (c) on March 22, 2010, “[Mr. Meléndez Quijano] was notified of the decision of […] March 19, 2010, [in which] the Military Judge of First Instance […] ordered execution of the sentence of nine months’ imprisonment and […] accessory penalties”; 15 (d) on March 23, 2010, Gloria de Meléndez had to leave the country because she had received “threats and telephone calls, […] and also because she had been followed on several occasions”; (e) on 14 In this regard, the State reported that “the security agent who accompanied Gloria de Meléndez advised and ratified that the supposed incident did not occur and described this as the implementation of a routine preventive action, because, at any time and in any situation, when reacting to vehicles that appear to accompany or to follow vehicles in which protected individuals are being driven, evasive maneuvers allow it to be confirmed whether a real incident is occurring and, on that occasion, it was verified that they were not being followed.” The State forwarded the Court a copy of the security agent’s report, which indicates that, on the day of the incident, she explained to Gloria de Meléndez that the vehicular maneuvers were “merely a precautionary measure.” 15 In the briefs of November 12, 2010, and April 28, 2011, the representation of the beneficiaries advised that the punishment imposed had been “changed to public service” and, in April 2011, Mr. Meléndez Quijano “was complying with this in the Office of the Mayor of San Salvador,” and that he had appealed the judgment and the same judge dismissed the appeal; therefore, [… he] presented an application for amparo,” which “was being processed” at April 28, 2011. 8