32. The Commission reiterated that it is not its task to identify ex officio which domestic remedies shall be exhausted, but it is instead the duty of the State to point out in a timely manner the domestic remedies that must be exhausted and their effectiveness. 2 As the Court has held, “the State raising this objection must specify the domestic remedies that have not yet been exhausted. It must also demonstrate that such remedies were available to the victim and were adequate, suitable and effective.”3 33. In the case instant petition, the State claimed that three remedies were not exhausted: i) the petition for writ of reversal of judgment on cassation, which would be in order “in the event that judges or courts have committed errors of substance or of procedure (in indicando or in procedendo);” and this way, should “judges commit errors, this remedy shall vacate the judgment and a new one is issued;” ii) the motion for review of judgment regulated by Article 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which can be filed once a “judgment is executed;” and iii) the “Constitutional Relief of Habeas Corpus,” regulated by Article 93 of the Constitution and “Chapter I of Title II of the Law of Constitutional Enforcement,” which provides for determining the legality of detentions. The State noted that such remedies are effective and suitable for the claims raised in this case. 34. In response, the petitioner contended that i) since the alleged torture was not investigated, the exception set forth in Article 46.2.c of the Convention is applicable; ii) because it took more than four years for the criminal proceeding to be settled, “this situation falls under the same exception;” iii) even though Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles filed a petition for writ of reversal of judgment on “cassation,” he was compelled to withdraw” it in order to make it possible for the judgment to be executed and obtain the benefit of release; and iv) the motion for review of judgment was not available inasmuch as, under the law of foreign nationals, once his sentence was served, Mr. Domingo Revelles was immediately deported back to his country. 35. Taking into account the positions of the parties, the Commission shall address hereunder the requirement of prior exhaustion with regard to the following claims that constitute the object of the instant petition: i) arrests of the alleged victims and their pretrial detention; ii) purported torture, beatings and mistreatment by the Interpol agents of Pichincha and alleged failure to investigate; and iii) alleged violations of right to a fair trial and judicial protection throughout their criminal proceedings. 1. Arrests of the alleged victims and their pretrial detention 36. The Commission notes that the petition for habeas corpus relief is one of the remedies raised by the State, which could be filed with “the Mayor under whose jurisdiction it is to decide whether the detention is or was legal.” However, while the State noted that it is regulated by the “Constitution” and Chapter II of the “Law of Constitutional Enforcement,” beyond that general reference, it failed to cite the relevant provisions of the law, or any evidence of the suitability and effectiveness thereof. 37. Based on the claims of the State, this remedy must be filed with an administrative authority, namely, the Office of the Mayor. On this score, the Inter-American Court has set the legal precedent that the requirement for persons held in custody to have to file for this remedy with the mayor and then have to file an appeal for a judicial authority to be able to entertain the petition, puts roadblocks up for a remedy that is supposed to be, by its very nature, simple.4. Both the Commission5 and the Court have held that filing a 2 IA Court of HR. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 23. 3 IA Court of HR. Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207. Para. 19. Citing. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, para. 91; Case of Garibaldi v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 23, 2009. Series C No. 203, para. 46, and Case of Escher et al v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009. Series C No. 199, para. 28. 4 IA Court of HR, Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 114, para. 129. 5 IACHR, Report No. 139/10, P-139-10, Admissibility, Luis Giraldo Ordóñez Peralta, Ecuador, November 1, 2010, para. 29; IACHR, Report No. 66/01, Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez, Ecuador, June 14, 2001, paras. 78-81; IACHR, Report No. 91/13, P-910-07, Admissibility, Daria Olinda Puertocarrero Hurtado, Ecuador, November 4, 2013. 6