-53results. The Court will examine the State’s actions in this case from these two points of view: a) respect for the principle of reasonable time, and b) the effectiveness of the habeas corpus procedure and of the criminal proceedings. a) Respect for the principle of reasonable time 66. The right to access to justice is not exhausted by the processing of domestic proceedings, but it also ensures the right of the victim or his next of kin to know the truth of what happened and for those responsible to be punished, within a reasonable time.28 67. With regard to the principle of reasonable time established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, this Court has established that three elements should be taken into account in determining whether the time in which the proceeding was conducted was reasonable: a) the complexity of the case; b) the procedural activity of the interested part, and c) the conduct of the judicial authorities.29 68. The Court has confirmed that since the criminal proceedings were reopened in April 1996 (supra para. 48(23)) and until the date of this judgment, the proceedings have remained at the investigation stage for approximately 7 years and 10 months and, furthermore, they was filed for one year. The investigation stage of the proceedings is still open and to date no one has been indicted. 69. The Court considers that a prolonged delay, such as the delay in this case, constitutes, in itself, a violation of the right to a fair trial.30 This unreasonableness, however, may be invalidated by the State, if the latter explains and proves that the delay is directly related to the complexity of the case or to the conduct of the parties to the case. 70. Based on the case history described in the chapter on proven facts, the Court acknowledges that the matter under investigation by the national courts in this case is complex and that this should be borne in mind when assessing the reasonableness of the time. 71. Nevertheless, the Court observes that the delays in the criminal proceedings examined in this case have not occurred because of the complexity of the case, but rather owing to the inaction of the judicial body, which is inexplicable. On several occasions during the investigation stage, long periods of time elapsed when the prosecutor did not ask the judge to take any measures and when the judge did not order any measures de oficio. Likewise, both the prosecutor and the judge have let months, and even more than a year, elapse before requesting and ordering the execution of a measure that had not been taken at the first procedural opportunity. 28 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 188; Case of Myrna Mack Chang, supra note 8, para. 209; and Case of Bulacio, supra note 8, para. 114. 29 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 20, para. 175; Case of Ricardo Canese. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 141; and Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 190. Likewise, cf. Wimmer v. Germany, no. 60534/00, §23, 24 February 2005; Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 129, 08 February 2005; and Todorov v. Bulgaria, no. 39832/98, § 45, 18 January 2005. 30 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 29, para. 142; Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 15, para. 191; and Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al.. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 145.