lived experience for the individual affected.163 In this context, the IACHR notes that Article 1(1) of the American Convention prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, age, and socioeconomic position, and thus, restricting rights based on those categories requires rigorous justification by the State to demonstrate that such restrictions do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.164 154. In this case, the Commission notes a series of gender stereotypes throughout the criminal process, the impact of which was to close certain lines of investigation or prevent an exhaustive analysis of the evidence; to determine the supposed motive of what happened without any evidentiary support; and to presume the guilt of the alleged victim. 155. The Commission observes that from the start of the process, the investigator assigned to the case stated that “As an investigator and a woman, it is my opinion that what this woman did (…) I would not have done (...) it was a little boy, well developed, with light brown skin (...) and physically very pretty, that any woman or mother would have raised with love (...).” Later, the judge who ordered the start of a formal preliminary investigation against the alleged victim said the alleged victim's intent to commit the crime could be established because "she was perfectly able to hide the pregnancy without her relatives finding out.” The IACHR concludes that the results of these stereotypes was that the criminal investigation presumed the alleged victim was guilty because she did not act as a pregnant woman typically would. 156. Additionally, in the guilty verdicts, the Court found based on certain gender stereotypes that Manuela had a motive to commit the crime. Specifically, it stated that: (i) it cannot be speculated that the alleged victim did not know anything and that another person had thrown the child in the septic tank because the maternal instinct is to protect the child, and all complications while giving birth generally lead a woman to seek medical care; (ii) the pregnancy was the result of infidelity, for which reason the alleged victim wanted to discard its outcome, which, according to the medical report, had been born healthy; and (iii) the biological father would not take responsibility. The Commission finds that these stereotypes caused the Court to fail to exhaustively assess certain evidence that pointed to the possibility described by the alleged victim, who said she had suffered a fall that caused a miscarriage and that it was another person who handled the newborn or that it was stillborn. The IACHR also observes that when factual gaps emerged on aspects that were important for determining criminal responsibility, they were filled with the stereotypes. The impact was to establish criminal responsibility, and not in a sense that imposed the presumption of innocence—that is, resolving doubts in favor of the defendant, or at least taking all possible evidentiary steps to objectively address those gaps rather than making the discriminatory assumptions described. 157. In addition, the IACHR recalls that Manuela was a poor, young, illiterate woman, and there are also indications that gender stereotypes were applied to Manuela in the way she was treated by different authorities in this case, which for this Commission cannot be disassociated from her poverty and age, as in practice, their convergence produced a situation of greater vulnerability of being the victim of discrimination particularly associated with it. 158. Based on these considerations, the Commission concludes that the State of El Salvador is responsible for the violation of the duty to justify, the presumption of innocence, and the principle of equal protection and nondiscrimination established in articles 8(1), 8(2), and 24, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, as well as Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará, to the detriment of Manuela. V. CONCLUSIONS 159. The Commission concludes that the State of El Salvador is responsible for the violation of the rights to life, personal liberty, fair trial, privacy, equal protection, judicial protection, and health established in articles 4(1), 5(1), 7(1), 7(2), 7(3), 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e), 8(2)(h), 11(2), 11(3), 24, 25.(1), and 26 of the Inter-American Court. Case of Ramírez Escobar et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of March 9, 2018. Series C No. 351, paras. 276-277; Inter-American Court. Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C No. 298, para. 290. 164 Inter-American Court. Case of I.V. v. Bolivia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 30, 2016. Series C No. 329. Judgment of May 25, 2017. Series C No. 336, para. 244 163 30