conviction was that he had not totally established his innocence; this was stated in the following terms: more so, since it has not been fully shown that Zegarra Marín was not aware of those events, in that no evidence has arisen indicating his total innocence of the crimes with which he is charged, since the expert evidence and organizational chart only served for his pre-trial release on bail.2 31. The petitioner reports that he challenged his conviction through an appeal for annulment, which the Supreme Criminal Chamber resolved on December 17, 1997, by upholding the conviction. On September 14, 1998, he filed an appeal for review with the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, which was dismissed as inadmissible on August 24, 1999. The petitioner states he was notified of that decision on November 5, 1999. 32. He points out that the appeal was ruled inadmissible on formal grounds, and that the decision was based on an opinion by two Supreme Court justices that clearly stated that while the remedy was not formally admissible, both his arrest and conviction were arbitrary in that they violated the most basic principles of due process as well as constitutional and legal human rights provisions. The petitioner textually cites the following sections of that opinion: Having examined the JUDGMENT questioned by the appellant, we see that effectively not all the evidence in the case file was assessed, particularly that identified in annex 9 of this opinion which is favorable to the appellant’s position (). The judgment is essentially based on the accusation of the other defendants, and there is no other evidence to corroborate those accusations (). It is argued in the judgment establishing the guilt of ZEGARRA MARÍN (THIRTEENTH “WHEREAS”) that he did not provide evidence to prove his innocence in full, thus violating due process in that sufficient grounds for that judgment do not exist: grounds that require the analysis and appraisal of all the evidence in the case, as provided by Article 139.5 of the Constitution and Article 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (). In addition, because of the violation and inversion of the principle of presumption of innocence, which as a fundamental right of all individuals is enshrined in Article 2.24.e of our Constitution ().3 33. He claims that as a result of his unfair inclusion in the judicial proceedings, based on the accusations of a criminal, both the written and broadcast media attacked him “cruelly and heartlessly, as if he were a lawbreaker of the worst kind” and that he was “treated inhumanly during his journeys to and from the court.” 34. The petitioner claims that the press coverage of the incident practically forced the Government to retire him from the National Police, and that his removal from service took place not on disciplinary grounds but because of a process of “staff renewal,” without justification and without first summoning or hearing from him, but thanking him for his services to the Nation. In the petitioner’s view, this deprived him of the “most basic right of defense.” 35. With regard to the State’s claim that he did not exhaust the available domestic remedies in pursuit of his reinstatement, the petitioner responds that he did exhaust both the administrative and judicial resources available and received unfavorable decisions. 36. The annexes submitted by the petitioner indicate that on March 20, 1996, he lodged an administrative appeal for reconsideration with the PNP, which was dismissed on January 8, 1997, on the grounds that it was presented after the filing deadline. The text of that resolution indicates 2 Annex 10 of the initial petition, received on May 16, 2000. 3 Annex 10 of the initial petition, received on May 16, 2000. 4