247. Furthermore, the Court notes that no clear measures existed for the execution of the agreements. 270 Nevertheless, it understands that other state institutions were involved in approval of the budget item and payment of the amount estimated based on the appraisals (supra paras. 118 and 123). 248. In this regard, the Court considers that in a system based on the principle of the rule of law, all public authorities, within their terms of reference, must abide by decisions adopted in out-of-court conciliation mechanisms such as those in the instant case. Furthermore, they should promote and execute them without undermining the meaning and scope of the decisions or unduly delaying their execution 271 in order to grant the Punta Piedra community certainty with regard to the right or dispute and, consequently, one of the effects of such mechanisms is its enforceability and the need to comply with it. Similarly, the Court considers that conciliation agreements such as this one, by which the State itself was bound, should be effective and, therefore, be adopted by mechanisms that permit their direct execution, without requiring other administrative or judicial actions to be taken 272 (supra para. 230). Therefore, it is not valid for the State to allege this requirement based on its own non-compliance, or on other reasons such as the lack of financial resources, to the detriment of the legal obligations with the status of res judicata assumed in the 2001 conciliation agreements and in violation of the principles of good faith and the practical effects (effet utile) of the said agreements. 273 249. The Court has also indicated that rulings must be the executed without undue obstruction or delay in order to achieve their purpose in a prompt, simple and comprehensive manner. 274 This is particularly important in cases involving indigenous matters because the special situation of vulnerability in which these peoples may find 270 Neither the 2001 undertaking nor the subsequent meetings established clearly the competences, functions and mechanisms that the Interinstitutional Commission or other authorities would have to execute the commitments made by the State (supra, para. 114). The 2001 undertaking only established that the Interinstitutional Commission was authorized to prepare a list of demands and a work schedule to resolve the conflict. 271 Cf. Mutatis mutandis, Case of Mejía Idrovo, supra, para. 106. Cf. also: in the Case of Inmobiliare Saffi v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) established that: “[i]n conclusion, while it may be accepted that Contracting States may [...] intervene in proceedings for the enforcement of a judicial decision, the consequence of such intervention should not be that execution is prevented, invalidated or unduly delayed or, still less, that the substance of the decision is undermined.” Cf. ECHR, Case of Inmobiliare Saffi v. Italy, No. 22774/93, Judgment of July 28, 1999, para. 74. 272 In its brief with final arguments before the Court, the State indicated that the prior administrative proceeding should be used in order for the State to comply with the “agreement” by which it was bound. The State did not establish what the suitable and effective judicial remedy was that should be used after having exhausted the administrative procedure. In its final arguments, the State also argued that the representatives had not used the existing domestic remedies available to any Honduran and merely indicated in general terms the existence of remedies such as “ownership claims before the civil courts,” “the application for amparo,” “a declaratory proceeding,” and “other guarantees and remedies that may be used,” without specifying how they would be adequate and effective in the specific case. These arguments were not raised at the admissibility stage before the Commission. 273 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court, Jurisdiction, supra, para. 36, and Case of Rochac Hernandez et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 14, 2014. Series C No. 285, para. 162. 274 Cf. Case of Mejía Idrovo, supra, para. 105, citing ECHR, Case of Matheus v. France (No. 62740/01), Judgment of March 31, 2005, para. 58. According to the principles proposed by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), a consultative body of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in matters related to the independence, impartiality and professional capacity of judges, “enforcement of judicial decisions should be fair, swift, effective and proportionate” (Cf. Opinion No. 13 (2010), On the role of https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ judges in the enforcement of judicial decisions. Available at: ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CCJE(2010)2&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorI ntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864. 71