enjoyment of the right to property of the Punta Piedra community. Therefore, the Court does not have sufficient evidence regarding the normative design of the ordinary general remedies alleged to know whether they are adapted to, or interpreted in keeping with, the relevant standards of the Convention; therefore, it is not appropriate to rule in this regard. 253. Moreover, regarding the alleged violation of Article 2 of the American Convention, the Court notes that although neither the representatives nor the Commission submitted specific arguments about the procedure under the Property Act, in force as of June 29, 2004, the Court notes that the State mentioned the third paragraph of article 102 of the act, which provides that “[a]ny conflict arising between these peoples and third parties concerning communal lands shall be submitted to the special procedure created by this law.” The said procedure is regulated in articles 110 and 111 of its Title VI “Procedures for jurisdictional dispute resolution.” 277 These articles establish the stages and terms of the procedure to resolve conflicts arising from the law itself. Consequently, the Court understands that, as of the entry into force of the act, a specific procedure existed to resolve disputes between indigenous and Afro-Honduran people and third parties with regard to communal lands. 254. Even though this law does not expressly indicate the characteristics of the remedy in relation to the standards applicable to resolve the territorial conflict between the Punta Piedra community and the Rio Miel community, the Court notes that, to date, no provision of the law has been applied to this specific case; therefore, it is not appropriate to rule in the abstract. Also, it has not been shown that this law has been interpreted in a way that has prejudiced the indigenous communities in Honduras. 255. Based on the foregoing, the Court considers that it does not have specific consistent elements to analyze the supposed incompatibility of the procedural norms; therefore, a direct violation of Article 2 of the American Convention, in connection with Articles 1(1) and 25 of this instrument has not been demonstrated in the instant case. However, the Court reiterates the relevance of due interpretation of the laws and application of control of conventionality in light of the Court’s case law and the standards applicable to indigenous matters that it has established. IX-3 RIGHTS TO LIFE, JUDICIAL GUARANTEES AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION 256. In this chapter he Court will analyze the disputes relating to the violation of Articles 4, 8 and 25 of the Convention. To this end, it will examine: (a) the right to life of Article 110 of the 2004 Property Act provides that “[a]ny matter related to this law shall be heard by the civil courts and be subject to the following special procedure: 1. When the written application has been filed, its admissibility shall be determined in two (2) days or its rectification shall be ordered within three (3) working days; 2. Once the application has been admitted, the respondent shall be summoned and required to answer it within three (3) working days. 3. Once the application has been answered, a date shall be set for a hearing to be held within five (5) working days of the answer. 4. During this hearing, the parties may establish the facts and file the arguments and objections they deem pertinent; then, evidence shall be proposed and provided; 5. If the parties are unable to provide all the evidence they proposed during the hearing, this will be suspended as often as necessary until all the proposed evidence has been produced, although this stage cannot exceed thirty (30) working days, and 6. Once the hearing has concluded, within five (5) working days, the judge shall set a judgment hearing during which he may rule on the main issue and any motions or objections. Any actions subsequent to the answer to the application shall be notified to the parties in stages, and the Court must expedite the proceedings ex officio.” In addition, article 111 of the 2004 Property Act indicates that “[t]he only remedy available against the said judgment shall be a cassation appeal per saltum before the Supreme Court of Justice” (evidence file, folios 2315 and 2316). 277 73