7 to social security and that it should only analyze and declare the international responsibility of the State in relation to the right to judicial protection and property enshrined in the Convention”. During the public hearing held in this case, the State was even more specific and pointed out that the objection of competence, raised by the State, refers to the claim made by the representative in order for the Court to declare the violation of Article 26 of the Convention inasmuch as it allegedly protects, according to the representative, the right to social security. In this regard, the State alleged that the right to social security falls out of the Court's competence ratione materiae since such right is not enshrined by the American Convention and it is not even one of the two rights (right to organize trade union and right to education) that would be actionable before the Inter-American system, in accordance with the provisions of Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador. 13. In such regard, the Commission considered that the “preliminary objection raised by the State must be rejected based on lack of legal grounds”. It pointed out, in the first place, that the State “did not raise any objection to the compliance with the requirements of admissibility” during the processing before the Commission, and therefore, its objection “is inadmissible by virtue of the principle of estoppel”. Furthermore, it mentioned that the “purpose of the application filed by the Commission does not intend to establish whether the members of the Association [...] are entitled to a right to social security and whether such right has or has not been respected, guaranteed or complied with by the Peruvian State. Such right has been acknowledged as such by the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Perú rendered on October 21, 1997 and January 26, 2001. Its content is not at issue before the Court [...]. What it is really at issue […] is the non-compliance with said judgments and the consequences that said non-compliance have for the right [to] property of the victims over their pensions”. Moreover, the Commission indicated that, even though the alleged violation of Article 26 of the Convention “is not part of the case submitted to [it], according to the case-law of the system, the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and deliberate on an alleged violation of said rule”. In any event, it pointed out that “the discussion whether the State violated or not Article 26 of the Convention forms part of the merits of the case at hand". Finally, it emphasized that “nor the Commission or the representative of the [alleged] victims have alleged the violation of the provisions of the [Protocol of San Salvador]”, and therefore “it is unnecessary for the Court to decide on its subject-matter jurisdiction in relation to said treaty”. 14. Moreover, the representatives also requested the Court to reject the preliminary objection raised by the State. It alleged that the Court is competent "to interpret and establish the scope of the general obligations to respect and guarantee, and to adapt the domestic legislation, regarding those rights that derived from economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural rules, contained in the OAS Charter, amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, to which Article 26 of the Convention refers”. In addition, it pointed out that the American Convention “does not exclude [from the Court’s competence] the interpretation and application [of] any right or provision of [said treaty]. Therefore, it must be understood that all the Articles […] are subject to interpretation by the Court’s adversarial jurisdiction”. Moreover, they indicated that even though “the subjectmatter of the controversy in the instant case consists of establishing whether the Peruvian State has incurred in international responsibility by failing to comply with two judgments, […] the right to judicial protection necessarily implies the indirect protection of the rights enshrined by [such] judgments, […] even when those [rights] are not protected by the Convention”. In this respect, the representative pointed out that the Court “has [decided] on cases involving the same or similar factual pattern [to] the one now being heard", and that the Court