7 41. The State affirms that “it recognizes and applies the norms of general and American International Law to the extent that those norms have been adopted by the national government […]. However, the sovereignty of the Dominican nation as a free and independent State is inviolable.” In the present case, the State contends that the armed forces “fulfilled their duty to empower the competent jurisdiction to shed light on such a regrettable incident.” 42. The State points out that the competence of the military tribunal to hear the facts is recognized in Article 2 of the Armed Forces Code of Justice which establishes that “[t]he administration of justice within the armed forces is the responsibility of the Courts Martial, the Provosts created by the present law and of the Supreme Court of Justice acting as Court of Cassation,” and in Article 145 of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces which establishes that “crimes and violations committed by military personnel in active service, shall be tried and sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Code of Military Justice.” In that regard, the State points out that Article 5 of the Criminal Code of the Dominican Republic establishes that its provisions are applicable to “Military Offenses, Violations or Crimes,” and, therefore, the Code “which is a general application of common law, acknowledges the existence of a special criminal jurisdiction for members of the Armed Forces.” The State further alleges that Article 55.17 of the Constitution grants “full authority to the President of the Republic to name or dismiss the members of the Joint Armed Forces and National Police Courts Martial.” According to the State, all the preceding arguments prove that at the time the events took place, the military tribunals were duly constituted and recognized to try crimes within their jurisdiction, “under the absolute rule of law.” 43. The State asserts that the Guayubín Massacre was fully investigated and that those responsible were brought before both civil and military justice. The State reports that the Investigative Board of General Officers “recommended that the prosecution of the individuals which were allegedly responsible for the crime of illicit trafficking in persons, be carried out by the ordinary justice system […] before […] the Public Prosecutor of the Judicial District of the Province of Montecristi,” since the special military jurisdiction cannot try persons who are not members of the armed forces. The State further adds that “the general principle of the right to the indivisibility of proceedings notwithstanding, the establishment of a special military jurisdiction for members of the Armed Forces and of ordinary jurisdiction for civilians is due to the fact that there is no connection between the offenses for which military personnel and civilians can be charged.” 44. The State reiterates that it has complied with “all substantive norms, international treaties and procedural laws in the process to empower the jurisdictional levels that, as an independent power, investigated, tried and issued rulings regarding members of the Armed Forces involved in the case.” 45. The State contends that the acquittal of the members of the military by the Appellate Joint Armed Forces and National Police Court Martial, although they had been convicted in the Court of First Instance, was due to the fact that those members of the military “benefitted from the general principle of the right to individualization of punishment given that, although […] the autopsies were performed and the causes of death, injury or blows received by the victims were determined, it was impossible to carry out ballistic analyses to identify which weapon fired which projectiles in order to be able to legally assign individual responsibility because the bullets fired could not be recovered due to the fact that they entered and exited the bodies of the victims.” 46. With regard to the petitioners’ contention that following the massacre the armed forces adopted an institutional posture that compromised the independence and impartiality of the military tribunal, the State points out that that contention is based on “a news report […] where the source providing the information was taken out of context, since the armed forces are not competent to define or classify what action or omission may constitute a criminal offense, and limited themselves to pointing out that the members of the military were doing their duty.” 47. Lastly, the State contends “[t]hat civil action may only be pursued in civilian courts and that that course of action shall be suspended until a final decision is rendered on the public action lodged