as high as the standard required to determine whether the right to effective remedy provided for in Article 25 of the Convention has been violated. 28. When examining the exception provided for in Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention, which concerns an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment on the adequate remedies invoked, the standard for the prima facie assessment of that delay is not as high as the one required to determine whether the right to due process within a reasonable period of time, recognized in Article 8(1) of the Convention, has been violated. There, the Inter-American Court has required that different criteria be considered: the conduct of the defendant, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the State. However, those criteria are not factored in when the admissibility of a case or a petition is examined. 15 The same can be said of the exception provided for in Article 46(2)(b) of the Convention, for cases in which the party whose rights have been violated is not given access to the remedies under domestic law or is prevented from exhausting them.16 29. As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the decision on the admissibility of a case involving a Convention Article 46(2) exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies, does not imply a prejudgment of the merits. Quite the contrary, such a the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, par. 17. 15 In Report Nº 29/98, Walter David Bulacio, Argentina, decision of May 5, 1998, par. 40, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rendered a previous and separate decision on the exception established in Article 46(2)(c). There, the Commission stated the following: “The State has not disputed that there has been a delay in pursuing the criminal action to investigate the facts, but maintains that this has been justified for different reasons, among these the exercise of the defendant’s right to defense and the interest that justice should be done. In this respect, the Commission observes that over seven years have elapsed since April 1991. It is clear from the description of the steps taken in Argentina to determine the circumstances of the arrest and death of Walter Bulacio that the investigation has not resulted in those responsible being punished. Consequently, prima facie, there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment in the present case.” In Report N° 74/99, Case 11.810, Sebastián Sánchez López et al., Mexico, May 4, 1999, the Commission found “prima facie that there has been an unreasonable delay in the decision on the jurisdictional remedies presented by the petitioners in Mexico. Therefore, the IACHR applies the exception of Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention.” See, also, Report N° 87/99, Case 11.506, José Victor Dos Santos et al., Paraguay, September 27, 1999; Report N° 87/99, case 11.506, José Victor Dos Santos and Waldemar Gerónimo Pinheiro, Paraguay, decision of September 27, 1999; Report Nº 30/00, Case 12.095, Mariela Barreto Riofano, Peru, March 23, 2000, par. 20. 16 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that: “A remedy must also be effective –that is, capable of producing the result for which it was designed (…) [resort to those remedies becomes a senseless formality] if there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered or tolerated by the government, the effect of which is to impede certain persons from invoking internal remedies that would normally be available to others. (...) The exceptions of Article 46(2) would be fully applicable in those situations and would discharge the obligation to exhaust internal remedies since they cannot fulfill their objective in that case.” An example of the “ineffective” remedies cited by the Court is that “Procedural requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus ineffective (…) if it presents a danger to those who invoke it; or if it is not impartially applied.” See: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C Nº 4, paragraphs 66-68; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Series C Nº 5, paragraphs 69-71; Fairén Garbi and Solís CorralesCase, Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C No.6, paragraphs 91-93; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, paragraphs 34-36. The Court has also held that “if an indigent needs legal counsel to effectively protect a right which the Convention guarantees and his indigency prevents him from obtaining such counsel, he does not have to exhaust the relevant domestic remedies. That is the meaning of the language of Article 46(2) read in conjunction with Articles 1(1), 24 and 8.” Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990, Series A Nº 11, par. 31. In Report 129/99, Case 11.565, Ana, Beatriz and Celia González Pérez, Mexico, November 19, 1999, the Commission concluded that “for different reasons, exhaustion of domestic remedies in Mexico was not possible, even though five years have elapsed since the facts allegedly occurred. Consequently, the Commission applies to the instant case the exception provided for in the second part of Article 46(2)(b) of the American Convention. The causes and effect of the lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies shall be analyzed in the report that the Commission will adopt on the merits, in order to determine whether they constitute violations of the American Convention.” In Report 89/00, Case 11.495,Juan Ramón Chamorro Quiroz, Costa Rica, decision of October 5, 2000, paragraphs 35 and 36, the Commission pointed out that: “Mr. Chamorro was not 'materially' able to invoke domestic legal remedies before leaving the country because he was taken directly from where he was captured to the place where he was deported. (…) detaining undocumented immigrants for several hours before deporting them is an administrative measure, taken within highly summary, almost automatic, proceedings, that does not allow them the opportunity of filing or attempting to seek any domestic remedy, including habeas corpus. In addition, since they had no papers and no means of economic support, they were unable to reenter Costa Rica to formulate complaints or invoke the applicable legal remedies, as claimed by the State (…) the Commission believes that the victim is exempted from the requirement of exhausting the internal legal remedies of Costa Rica, given the existence of the exception set forth in Article 46(2)(b).” 8