of improvement related to certain socio-economic or labor conditions, the IACHR underlines the instrumental component of such a right for the achievement of other fundamental rights within the labor sphere, the balance in relations between employers and workers, the resolution of collective labor disputes and the materialization of respect for human dignity and labor rights; it becomes the channel of the participatory democratic principle within the sphere of work. 84. While the right to strike is not absolute, and can be limited by law, the restrictions must take into account the purpose of that right; so that workers do not face unduly restrictions to its right or that it becomes inoperative in practice. The IACHR understands that the right to strike, as well as the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, can be described as a freedom as long as it is necessary for the State to refrain from unduly interfering with the exercise of said right and to ensure that the conditions and guarantees necessary for its effective realization exist. The IACHR observes that the enjoyment of the right to strike is a prerequisite, and at the same time, the result of the enjoyment of other human rights; for example, it may allow to make visible irregular or unsatisfactory work practices that then can lead to changes for the realization of the right to work and its fair and equitable conditions. At the same time, it can be a corollary of the exercise of the rights of freedom of expression and assembly, as it is a collective transitory manifestation in defense of the interests of workers, and therefore be directly related, according to the facts of each case, to said rights. 85. On that basis, and as the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining, the IACHR also considers that it is important to specify that the element of progressivity presented within Article 26 of the ACHR, which can usually affect the evaluation of certain components of economic and social rights, does not generate substantive consequences on the analysis of the right to strike due to the way in which such a right is materialized in practice. Hence, the threshold to allow limitations related to the obligation of progressivity of the States in relation to the right to strike must be much stricter and higher, and by no means should imply the lack of protection of workers against acts of discrimination, interference or retaliation in the exercise of their rights in the workplace. 86. The Commission recalls that the instant case refers to 93 employees of the Judiciary who were dismissed from their jobs for having participated in a strike between March 19 and April 2, 1996, when the lawfulness of the strike had not yet been ruled on. The IACHR takes note that, for declaring the lawfulness of a strike, it was necessary, pursuant to the Labor Code, for the striking employees to account for at least two thirds of the total number of employees of the Judiciary. 87. The ILO Committee of Experts had already ruled, on various occasions, that Article 241 (c) of the Labor Code of Guatemala in force at the time of the incidents, which established that, to undertake a lawful strike, the employees had to account for at least two thirds of the company or production center, was incompatible with the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 87 because of the high number required for holding a lawful strike. 64 88. Said Committee has indicated that, if a state deems it relevant to establish, by law, that, in order to decide on a strike, the voting of the workers is necessary, 65 the required number must consist of a simple majority of the workers attending the vote and that the quorum for this must be set reasonably. 66 89. The IACHR shall assess whether or not said legal constraint on the right to strike turned out to be acceptable in terms of the treaty concerned. The IACHR recalls that, in order to determine whether or not the restriction of a right is acceptable in terms of the treaty concerned, both the Commission and the Court have resorted to a scaled judgment of proportionality, which includes the following elements: (i) the existence of a legitimate goal; (ii) suitability, that is, the determination of whether or not there is a logical means-to-end relationship between the goal sought and the distinction; (iii) necessity, that is, to determine if there are less restrictive but equally suitable alternatives; and (iv) proportionality in the strict sense of the word, that is, Observation (CEACR) adopted 1989, published 76th ILC session (1989). Observation (CEACR) adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007). 66 Observation (CEACR) adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007); Observation (CEACR) adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session (2002). 64 65 15