33. With regard to the Commission's jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the petition, the facts are said to have occurred as of November 2002, by which time the international human rights instruments applicable to the case were already in force in Panama. 34. Finally, the Commission is competent ratione materiae, because the petition denounces violations of human rights protected by the American Convention and by the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 2. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 35. Article 46.1.a of the American Convention states that admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Article 44 shall be subject to the requirement that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. The purpose of this requirement is to allow national authorities to learn of the alleged violation of a protected right and, in appropriate cases, to resolve it before it is taken before an international instance. 36. The requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies is met when the national system is furnished with remedies that are adequate and effective to repair the alleged violation. In this connection, the exception to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, contained in Article 46.2 of the American Convention, does not apply when there is denial of justice: the domestic legislation of the State concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated; the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies. As indicated by Article 31 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, when the petitioner contends that he or she is unable to prove compliance with the requirement indicated in this article, it shall be up to the State concerned to demonstrate to the Commission that the remedies under domestic law have not been previously exhausted, unless that is clearly evident from the record. 37. Based on inferences from the principles of international law, as reflected in precedents established by the Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it is especially important that the State against which a claim is being lodged should invoke the plea of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies in the early stages of the proceedings before the Commission.4 At the same time, given the burden of proof incumbent upon it in such matters, the State that alleges non-exhaustion should point to the domestic remedies that need to be exhausted and give proof of their effectiveness.5 38. In the instant case, the petitioner first invoked the exception established in Article 46.2 of the American Convention, whereby the party alleging violation of his rights, Mr. Vélez Loor, was not allowed access to domestic remedies, in light of his deportee status. His second argument in support of applying the exception to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is the fact that the alleged victim was unable to pay a lawyer to take the case to the Panamanian courts, pursuant to Advisory Opinion 11/90 of the Inter-American Court. The petitioner explains that it was impossible for Mr. Vélez Loor to have access to remedies under domestic law as he had no fixed employment, given that he is a person who makes a living from selling miscellaneous articles, such as markers, etc. 39. Also attached are a number of complaints made by Mr. Vélez Loor before the Human Rights Commission of the National Congress of Ecuador, the Office of the Ombudsperson of 4 I/A Court H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Preliminary Objections. Judgment of February 1, 2000, para. 53; I/A Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi Case, Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998, para. 56; I/A Court H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 31, 1996, para. 40. The Commission and the Court have found that the early stages of the proceedings should be defined as the stage for assessing the admissibility of the proceedings before the Commission —i.e., before any assessment of the merits. See, for example, IACHR, Report No. 71/05, P-543/04, Admissibility, Ever de [Jesús] Montero Mindiola, Colombia, October 13, 2005, which cites, I/A Court H.R., Herrera Ulloa Case. Judgment of July 2, 2004, para. 81. 5 Cf. IACHR, Report Nº 32/05, P-642/03, Admissibility, Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral et al. (persons living with HIV/AIDS), Guatemala, March 7, 2005, paras. 33-35; I/A Court H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of February 1, 2000, supra, note 4, para. 53; I/A Court H.R., Durand and Ugarte Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of May 28, 1999, para. 33; Cantoral Benavides Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of September 3, 1998, para. 31. 7