2 from the numerous references made to it in the considerations 5 and in the operative paragraphs of the judgment.6 5. Consequently, if the Court had chosen an approach focused on social rights, I consider that it would have clarified some aspects of the decision; for example, the distinction between the right of access to information (Article 13 of the American Convention), and the guarantee of the accessibility of information as a means or instrument to implement the right to health (under Article 26 of this treaty).7 Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Secretary See, in particular, paras. 147, 157, 158, 163, 165, 187, 205, 209, 235, 243, 300, 305, 332, 340 and 341 of the judgment. 6 Operative paragraphs 8 and 11 of the judgment. 7 Thus, from a perspective of the right to health (sexual and reproductive), I understand that, when reference is made to access to information, and through this to informed consent, the intention is not to indicate that matters of lack or scant information in relation to health (sexual and reproductive) has to be analyzed in light of the right of access to information, because in cases of lack of prior informed consent and enforced or involuntary sterilization, it is the right to sexual and reproductive health that is violated directly and, interdependently, access to information, and not vice versa. Informed consent by means of the accessibility of information is a principle and a fundamental right that, in turn, protects personal autonomy, personal liberty, personal dignity, and the right to raise a family and forms part of the right to sexual and reproductive health. 5 2