and to judicial protection, established in articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, were violated when he was arbitrarily stripped of his nationality via an administrative decision that resulted from an administrative action of which he was never notified and of which he learned only when the decree stripping him of his nationality was published. A series of irregularities in this judicial process and thereafter denied him his right of self-defense, leaving him with no means to defend himself. 41. The pertinent parts of the victim's petition and other documents added thereafter were forwarded to the Peruvian Government as "additional information" on November 25, 1997; the Government was given 15 days in which to comment. 42. As for the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the petitioner stated that in the instant case, "for applications seeking writs of habeas corpus and amparo, the Peruvian Judiciary has no independent and honest judges who ensure that amparo is an effective means to defend the constitutional rights invoked." 43. On October 17, 1997, the Commission received a brief alleging that at the present time the State's duties and obligations cannot be performed because of a problem of unrestrainability created by the amendment introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure with Laws Nos. 26.599 and 26.756. The constitutionality of both these laws was being challenged in the Constitutional Court. This, in the victim's judgment, exacerbates his situation; the harm he is suffering is irreparable because any action seeking to redress the damage caused is ineffective. Hence, urgent precautionary measures are needed. 44. In another brief filed that same date, the victim enclosed a list of background information on Dr. Percy Escobar, judge on Lima's Provisional Public Law Bench and who, in the petitioner's judgment, "was appointed to the bench for political reasons, despite the fact that he did not have the ethical and professional qualifications for the office"; Dr. Percy was the one who heard the application that Mr. Ivcher filed in the lower courts seeking a writ of amparo. Enclosed was a copy of Memorandum No. 922-97-UA/csjl, to which was attached a full record of the disciplinary measures ordered against Judge Percy Escobar. 45. On October 20, 1997, Mr. Ivcher presented a memorandum to the Commission, to which he attached a notarized document dated December 6, 1984, which was issued on July 6, 1990, in which Baruch Ivcher's renunciation of his Israeli nationality is made official, as well as an explanation provided by the Notary Public, Dr. Máximo L. Vargas, who twice provided testimony about the above mentioned public document. 46. Later, in filings dated November 19 and December 3, 1997, and January 6, January 29 and February 11, 1998, the victim provided additional information and stood by the arguments made previously in connection with the admissibility of the case. 47. For its part, in notes dated December 2, 1997, January 15, 1998, January 16, 1998 and January 27, 1998, the Peruvian State provided additional information to reinforce its argument that the case was inadmissible because not all remedies before the Peruvian courts had been exhausted. 48. On February 26, 1998, during the Commission's 98th period of sessions, the Commission held a second admissibility hearing on this case. At this hearing, information was provided that a final internal remedy was pending before the Peruvian courts, presented on January 16, 1998 by Baruch Ivcher before the Constitutional Court, against the judgment of the court of appeals which had denied the writ of amparo. Also, it was added that pursuant to its governing law, the Constitutional Court has a time period of 20 days within which to decide a writ of amparo presented to it.1 V. ADMISSIBILITY 1 Law No. 26.435. Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. Article 43 provides that "The Court, has a maximum time period of ... 20 days, for dealing with cases concerning the denial of a writ of amparo ..." 6