to the obligations under Article 1.1 thereof to the detriment of Rocío San Miguel Sosa, Magally Chang Girón, and Thais Peña Coromoto. 3. Reasonable time analysis of the amparo remedy 199. The Commission will now consider whether in the processing of the amparo remedy the State respected the guarantee of reasonable time. The amparo was filed on July 22, 2004 and finally solved on September 9, 2005, that is, 14 months later. 200. The Inter-American Court jurisprudence has found that it is necessary to take into account four elements to determine the fairness of such term: a) the complexity of the matter, b) the procedural activity of the interested party, c) the conduct of judicial authorities, and d) the impairment to the legal situation of the person involved in the proceedings188. 201. With regard to the complexity of the matter, the Commission notes that the amparo remedy filed against the National Border Council seek for the Court to declare that the administrative act of dismissal was a violation of the right to equality before the law, to the guarantee of non-discrimination, and of labor rights and job stability, as well as the restitution of the alleged victims to their jobs. Although, as noted above, cases of misuse of power or covert discrimination may take some complexity, especially in terms of evidence, the Commission notes that the judicial proceedings of amparo filed by the victims was very specific, since it consisted of the amparo presentation accompanied by the supporting documents. The Commission has no information on a relevant evidentiary display that could justify the delay of 14 months to rule on an appeal. Consequently, the Commission considers that the State did not prove that the delay was attributable to the complexity of the case. 202. Regarding the procedural activity of the interested party, the petitioners filed the amparo on 22 July 2004. On August 4, 2004 the Fourth Court of First Instance declared itself incompetent to hear the action and referred the amparo case to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. In at least three occasions the victims petitioned the Constitutional Court a ruling on the challenges to the jurisdiction matter. On May 26, 2005 the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a ruling stating that it does not accept the challenges to the jurisdiction. Under this, on June 17, 2005 the Fourth Court of First Instance admitted the amparo. On July 20, 2005 the alleged victims appeared to a constitutional hearing before the Fourth Court of First Instance of Labor Matters, and the end of the hearing the Fourth Court of First Instance dismissed the amparo, and indicated that it would issue a decision stating the matters of fact and law of the decision, within five working days of the hearing. On July 27, 2005 the Fourth Court issued the judgment on the merits, dismissing the amparo claim. Under this, on July 29, 2005 the alleged victims appealed. On September 9, 2005 the Third Superior Court for Labor of the Labor Judicial Circuit dismissed the appeal. In this regard, the Commission notes that the alleged victims were actively involved in the process without any elements that might attribute the delay in the decision of amparo. 203. As for the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Commission notes that Article 26 of the Constitution provides the right to obtain a corresponding prompt decision from the organs of justice189. Venezuelan law, specifically the Organic Law on Protection of Rights and Constitutional Guarantees of 1988, in force at the time, provided for the amparo as a quick remedy to respond to alleged violations of human rights. 188 I/A Court H.R., Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para.112. 189 See Article 26 of the Political Constitution of the Bolivarian http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/constitucion/titulo3.php#cap2sec2 40 Republic of Venezuela, available at: