7 in the case of Colozza and Rubinat v. Italy (1985), in which it was held that the distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result "was not determinative" of the verified violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights; actually, the European Court viewed such conventional provision as "imposing an obligation of result."21 22. Following the same line of reasoning, in the Case of the Hostages in Tehran (United States v. Iran, Judgment of May 24, 1980), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) categorically ordered the respondent State22 to “immediately” terminate the unlawful detention of the nationals of the applicant State, and that it “immediately” release them, ensuring that they have the necessary means of leaving its territory, and “immediately” return to the respondent State the premises, property, archives and documents of its Embassy and Consulates. The ICJ even relied on "the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (para. 91),23 and stated that, in its opinion, the obligations binding on the respondent State were not "merely contractual,” but rather "obligations under general international law" (para. 62).24 23. Most significantly, in its Judgment in the Case of the Hostages in Tehran, the ICJ stressed "the imperative character of the legal obligations" incumbent upon the respondent State (para. 88).25 In other words, there was no room for doubt that conventional obligations and obligations under general international law were obligations of result, not merely of conduct. Indeed, where human rights are at stake, hardly may one escape the conclusion that we are necessarily faced with true obligations of result, so that the effective protection of the rights inherent in the individual is guaranteed. 24. Absolute prohibitions against violations of rights that cannot be derogated can be nothing other than obligations of result.26 Basically, the whole conceptual universe of the law of the international responsibility of States needs to be reformulated in the specific context of the international protection of human rights. Luckily, efforts have already started in this regard.27 Even if the so-called distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result is considered, such distinction still appears as "unhelpful" and "a potential source of confusion,” since the test to determine state responsibility in this area is necessarily objective in nature, given “the practical need for the effective application of International Law."28 21 . 22 . ICJ Reports (1980) p. 44, operative paragraph n. 3 (unanimously approved). 23 . ICJ Reports (1980) p. 42. 24 . ICJ Reports (1980) p. 31. 25 . ICJ Reports (1980) p. 41. Ibid., pp. 129-130. 26 . Cf., in this regard, in the context of the international protection of human rights, A. Marchesi, Obblighi di Condotta e Obblighi di Risultato - Contributo allo Studio degli Obblighi Internazionali, Milano, Giuffrè Ed., 2003, pp. 166-171. 27 . Cf., e.g., F. Urioste Braga, Responsabilidad Internacional de los Estados en los Derechos Humanos, Montevideo, Edit. B de F, 2002, pp. 1-115 and 139-203. 28 . L.G. Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1995, pp. 141-142 and 149, and cf. pp. 145, 150-152 and 156.