proceedings. The petitioner alleges that on June 1, 2006, the Fourth Sentencing Court of La Paz issued Resolution No. 13/06 in which it found unanimously that the action had extinguished and disposed of the corresponding file. In the resolutory part of the Resolution, the Court states: [t]he file makes it abundantly clear that there has been a delay, to the point of unworkability, firstly on the part of the officials charged with carrying out the notifications necessary to constitute a court with jury, with part of the responsibility lying with the jurisdictional agencies which, for baseless reasons, have suspended hearings or sent the case from one jurisdiction to another, and there is no reason for risking the interest of the parties to learn the outcome of their legal action, because it is evident that the defendant has complied with his duty to present himself before the courts to which he has been called and that the agencies in charge of administering justice have been playing with the law in such a way as to bring about real damage to the correct administration of justice. 39. The petitioner maintains that Resolution No. 13/06 was appealed by the prosecutor and by I.V. and that on 23 August, 2006, the Criminal Court of the Superior Court of Justice of La Paz confirmed the extinguishment of the public criminal proceedings because more than three years had passed. As grounds for the resolution, the petitioner indicates that the Criminal Court indicated that the proceedings had lasted more than six years since proceedings were first opened and that this procedural delay could be imputed to the Court where proceedings first opened because it twice incurred nullity of proceedings due to procedural failings. This resolution was notified to I.V. on September, 2006. B. State 40. The State maintains that on July 1, 2000, I.V. was submitted to an emergency caesarian in the Hospital de la Mujer. The State alleges that in accordance with the information provided on the medical file, I.V. had been admitted on the basis of a diagnosis of premature rupture of the membrane without being in labor, which also presented complications during the operation. It states that during the operation multiple adhesions presented, and this was the reason why Dr. Edgar Torrico informed I.V. of the risk to her life if she were to become pregnant again, and why he suggested to her that a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy should be carried out. The State alleges that when I.V. was verbally informed of these risks, she decided to give her verbal consent, but the doctors decided to search for the husband who was not in the hospital. 41. The State specifically refers to the statement made by Dr. Edgar Torrico who claims: [.]the patient was immediately told about the complications in her womb, the risks of undergoing further surgery and the risk to her life that would be caused by any further pregnancy and she was recommended, from a medical point of view, to take the opportunity of having a salpingo-oophorectomy. A junior doctor was sent to look for the husband in order to tell him of this decision but he was not to be found in the hospital. Mrs. I.V. agreed and gave her consent to the operation to perform a bilateral fallopian tube ligature. 42. The State alleges that the ligature of the fallopian tubes did not result from harassment by public officials, but from a personal decision made by the alleged victim while the caesarian was being carried out. It also alleges that the anesthesia which she was given (an epidural) does not affect consciousness, and that I.V. had been given enough information appropriate to her circumstances at that time. The State also alleges that there was no evidence of additional anesthesiological procedures that would indicate that the patient was suffering from stress because of the operation. 43. The State adds that for the second surgical operation, that is, the ligature of the fallopian tubes, there existed no pre-operative, written, and signed consent by either the patient nor her family as demanded by Articles 19 and 23 of the Code of Medical Ethics. These articles establish that the sterilization of a person may only be undertaken at the express, voluntary, and documented wish of the patient, or when medical indications exist that have been strictly 7